COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"The committee will perceive, that the great object I have in view, is, to raise a large part of the supplies within the year. The extent to which I wish to carry this principle is this; that there shall be no increase whatever of the public debt during the war."——Mr. ADDINGTON's Speech, 13th June, 1803.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

LETTER OF NAPOLEON.——*Letter from the Emperor* NAPOLEON *to his Majesty the* KING OF ENGLAND, *dated 2d January, 1805, and communicated to the Legislative Body of France on the 4th of February, 1805.*

SIR AND BROTHER,—Called to the throne of France by Providence, and by the suffrages of the senate, the people and the army, my first sentiment is a wish for peace. France and England abuse their prosperity. They may contend for ages; but do their governments well fulfil the most sacred of their duties, and will not so much blood, shed uselessly, and without a view to any end, condemn them in their own consciences? I consider it as no disgrace to make the first step. I have, I hope, sufficiently proved to the world, that I fear none of the chances of war; it besides presents nothing that I need to fear; peace is the wish of my heart, but war has never been inconsistent with my glory. I conjure your Majesty not to deny yourself the happiness of giving peace to the world, nor to leave that sweet satisfaction to your children: for certainly there never was a more fortunate opportunity, nor a moment more favourable, to silence all the passions, and listen only to the sentiments of humanity and reason. This moment once lost, what end can be assigned to a war which all my efforts will not be able to terminate! Your Majesty has gained more within ten years, both in territory and riches, than the whole extent of Europe. Your nation is at the highest point of prosperity; what can it hope from war?—To form a coalition with some powers of the Continent! The Continent will remain tranquil: a coalition can only increase the preponderance and continental greatness of France. To renew intestine troubles?—The times are no longer the same. To destroy our finances?—Finances founded on a flourishing agriculture can never be destroyed. To take from France her colonies?—The colonies are to France only a secondary object; and does not your Majesty already possess more than you know how to preserve? If your Majesty would but reflect, you must perceive that the war is without an object, without any presumable result to yourself. Alas! what a melancholy prospect to cause two nations to fight merely for the sake of fighting. The world is sufficiently large for our two nations to live in it, and reason is sufficiently powerful to discover means of reconciling every thing, when the wish for reconciliation exists on both sides. I have however fulfilled a sacred duty, and one which is precious to my heart. I trust your Majesty will believe in the sincerity of my sentiments, and my wish to give you every proof of it, &c. NAPOLEON.

LETTER OF LORD MULGRAVE.——*Answer given by Lord Mulgrave, Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs, dated the 14th January, 1805. The letter was addressed to M. Talleyrand.*

His Britannic Majesty has received the letter which has been addressed to him by the head of the French Government, dated the 2d of the present month. There is no object which his Majesty has more at heart, than to avail himself of the first opportunity to procure again for his subjects the advantages of a peace, founded on bases which may not be incompatible with the permanent security and essential interests of his dominions. His Majesty is persuaded that this end can only be attained by arrangements which may at the same time provide for the future safety and tranquillity of Europe, and prevent the recurrence of the dangers and calamities in which it is involved. Conformably to this sentiment, his Majesty feels it is impossible for him to answer more particularly to the overture that has been made him, till he has had time to communicate with the Powers on the Continent with whom he is engaged in confidential connexions and relations, and particularly the Emperor of Russia, who has given the strongest proofs of the wisdom and elevation of the sentiments with which he is animated, and the lively interest which he takes in the safety and independence of the Continent.

MULGRAVE.

LORD ROBERT FITZGERALD'S LETTER *to M. D'Aranjo D'Arevedo, Minister of Foreign*

Affairs at Lisbon: dated 25th of January, 1805.

SIR,——Did I not entertain for the Portuguese nation the highest respect, I should, perhaps, pass over in silence the indecent publication which has appeared in the Supplement to the Gazette of Lisbon of this day, of an article under the title of 'Manifesto of the Prince of Peace,' dated Madrid, the 20th of December, 1804. But anxious, Sir, as I am to possess the good opinion of a loyal nation, which is esteemed by mine, it is just that I should protest in an official and ostensible manner against the insertion of so base a libel as that to which I allude, more particularly, as the Gazette of Lisbon is the only journal circulated in Portugal; as it is published under the sanction, and subject to the control of the Government, and as it is, of course, marked with an official character, which gives credit with the public to every thing that appears in it.——I repeat, Sir, that anxious of the good opinion of this nation, I cannot be indifferent to the sentiments it entertains of mine; and what would be its sentiments if a public Minister of his Britannic Majesty, witnessing, under the character of authenticity, the publication of those foul calumnies with which that manifesto teems, were by his silence to admit, at least, tacitly, the reality of the abominable crimes with which his countrymen are reproached? What would be its sentiments, if a Minister of his Majesty felt no indignation at the horrible charge preferred against the English, of suffering their prisoners of war to die of hunger, or of compelling them to enter into their service against their own country; finally, if he felt no indignation to hear them denounced to all Europe as objects of universal detestation, with the most shameful and aggravating epithets, and at the same time degrading to the ancient and brave Spanish nation (to excite whose ardour it was sufficient but to show an enemy); and injurious to the generous people against whom they are directed. No, Sir, we do not starve our prisoners to death;—we do not force them to take up arms against their country. If Spain mourns the fate of the unfortunate persons, who perished at a moment when a measure of precaution dictated the necessity of detaining certain ships of war belonging to that nation by the British cruisers: Do us, Sir, the justice to believe, that that sorrow is as general and sincere in England; and that the mourning we wear is at the bottom of our hearts. No, Sir, our hands are not stained with innocent blood; and we would readily shed some of our own to restore to life the victims of a cruel chance, which we constantly deplore.——These, Sir, are the principle points on which I have to vindicate the outraged honour of my nation, while I wait for the instructions of his Majesty with respect to the exemplary punishment which it is entitled to demand of the Portuguese Government, on the Editors or Printers who inserted in the said Gazette, no doubt, without its knowledge, a libel so prejudicial to the honour of its august ally.—I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration, your Excellency's, &c.

ROBERT S. FITZGERALD.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

M. TALLEYRAND'S REPORT, *made to the Conservative Senate of France, relative to the Overtures of Peace, made by the Emperor of France to the King of England. Dated 4th Feb.* 1805. *(See the Emperors' Letter, p. 257.)*

The national solemnity of the coronation, this noble and necessary consummation of our social institutions, was connected with sensations too profound and too general not to have occupied the undivided attention of all classes in the state; on the approach, after the accomplishment of this great internal event, which has just secured for ever the destinies of France, in consecrating by the suffrages of men, and by the voice of Heaven, all that we have acquired in glory, in grandeur, and independence, it was generally, and as it were by one common impression felt, that the interest of all other events was weakened and diminished; and even the thought of the war, in the bosom of a nation owing so much to its victories seem to disappear. Every thing is accomplished; the Empire is founded, and in resuming his attention to exterior concerns, and in recalling the spirit of the nation to the interests of the war, the first sentiment of the Emperor has been to raise himself above every passion, and to justify the exalted destiny which Providence reserves for him, by shewing himself inaccessible to hatred, ambition, or revenge. If there exist the men, who have conceived the project of combating us with the arms of crimes, who have to the utmost of their power, realised this cruel thought, who have hired assassins, and who, even at this very moment, pension our enemies; it is over these identical passions that the Emperor wished to triumph. The more natural and common it was to feel a lively resentment against personal attacks, the more was he sensible that it was the part of a great mind to be proof against it. This determination is noble; but it differs widely from ordinary rules; and on so rare an

occasion, I ought to forget for a moment the principles of propriety, which would prevent me, in other instances, from offending by my praises the Sovereign, whose minister I have the honour to be. In the present instance, I cannot explain those measures, the generosity of which supposes an insensibility to the common laws of prudence, without justifying them; and without intending it, my justification is our eulogium.——The Emperor has made the first overtures to a government, which has been guilty of aggression, which has manifested without motive and without disguise, sentiments of inveterate hatred towards him and towards us. In order to comprehend adequately such an instance of moderation, we must resort to the remembrance of the past, and follow the progress of an august Sovereign through the whole extent of his noble career. Have not such men, as have studied his character, discovered in the bold flight, in the vigorous and constant execution of all his enterprises, a stock of calmness and of prudence which regulated them, a check that prevented every abuse; in a word, a burst of justice and humanity, incessantly tending to moderate the effects, and to accelerate the term of necessary acts of violence? Thus, after a succession of advantages gained on the Banks of the Drave, far from suffering himself to be led on by the hopes, with which the most bountiful fortune seemed disposed to intoxicate him, he calculated, that it was more advantageous for France, and for her enemies, that he should act temperately. To the great attractions of glory, he opposed the grand interest of humanity. He was sensible to the cries of those victims, who were to be, without delay, sacrificed in the last actions of an implacable war, and he made propositions of peace. From that time, with that view into futurity which outstrips events, and discriminates them even in the causes that are to produce them, he had foreseen all the blood that was to flow on the fields of Marengo and Hohenlinden; and insensible to these presages, which held out to France, and to its brave army, fresh laurels and new conquests, he listened only to wisdom and humanity, which give a sanction to glory, but dictate sacrifices.——The same principle inspired him with the same magnanimity; when called upon to take the reins of government, he united the title of First Consul to his reputation as a general, and the authority of the chief magistracy to the unlimited ascendancy of the glory which he had acquired. On all sides he addressed the language of peace, and he succeeded in making himself understood. After peace had been restored to the Continent, there yet remained an enemy to France. On the 24th of January, year 8, he made a proposal of peace to the King of England. The generous conqueror of the year 5, the First Consul, pacificator of the year 8, could not be deficient in the same magnanimous moderation, in the person of the august sovereign, to whom Heaven has confided our destinies. The degrees of power, the diversity of situations, produce no change in those eminent qualities, which may justly be styled the virtues of character: and the Emperor was bound for the third time to propose peace, in order to prove, that it was not idly he had uttered, on a solemn occasion, these never to be forgotten words, "Soldiers, as First Consul, I had but one sentiment; as Emperor, I can entertain no other." It is two years since war has been declared, and it has not been practicable to commence it. All its operations have been preparatory in projects; but the moment having arrived when the prosecution of it must produce real events, and give birth to the most terrible chances, the Emperor thought that it was essential to the principle of that political religion, which, without doubt, draws down upon the thoughts and efforts of just and generous princes the assistance of Heaven, to do every thing in his power to prevent great calamities by making peace.——I am directed to communicate to you the letter which, with this view of moderation and humanity, his Majesty the Emperor has thought proper to write to his Majesty the King of Great Britain: (*Here he read the Letter of Napoleon to the King of England, see p.* 257.) In estimating the advantages of our position, and in reflecting on that unanimous display of affection and respect, which during the late circumstances exhibited to us the whole of France absolutely disposed to devote itself to maintain the honour of the French name, the glory of the throne, and the power of the empire, I shall not conceal that, being the only person admitted, as minister, to the participation of that determination, I ought, in order to appreciate it fully, to regard it less with a view to itself, to its heroic principle—to contemplate it rather as a result of character than as the application of a maxim of state. If any other prince had communicated to me such a disposition, I should have felt, that the power of my office and my personal devotion would impose on me the duty of opposing it by my advice. And, in fact, what is our situation?

And on which side are the advantages of the war? We have not lost any thing. Within and without every thing has been improved amongst us. Our flotillas, the creation of which seemed a chimerical project, the union of which appeared to be impossible, have been created and collected together as if by enchantment. Our soldiers are become seamen; we might say, that the ports and the coasts have been transformed into cities, where the landsmen and seamen apply themselves in full security, and as, during peace, to the terrible and dangerous exercises of war. No doubt we have fewer vessels than England, but their number is sufficient to enable them, after a conjunction wisely prepared, to strike a mortal blow against the enemy.—Spain, involved in the contest by provocations without pretext or excuse, has given us, for auxiliaries, the disapprobation of Europe for an unjust aggression, the indignation of a generous people, and the forces of a great kingdom. Invulnerable on our territory, we have proved that vigilance and an energy which never relaxes, are sufficient for our security. Our colonies are beyond the reach of attack: Guadaloupe, Martinique, the Isle of France, would defy an expedition of 20,000 men. Our cities, our plains, our manufactures prosper: the regular and ready receipt of the imposts attests the inexhaustible fecundity of agriculture and industry: commerce, accustomed during the last ten years to be conducted through its expensive relations with England, proceeds now in another channel, and substitutes for these relations, communications more profitable, more independent, and more secure. There are no new imposts; no loans; a debt which cannot increase, but must diminish: in a word, an union of means sufficient to support during ten years, the existing state of war; such is the position of France. This war has indeed been scarcely offensive; but it is far from having been inactive, France has been guaranteed. She has created strength hitherto unknown. She has produced in the bosom of an enemy's country, a perpetual source of disquietude, without remedy; and by a prudence and an unbending energy, she has acquired for ever the confidence of the Continent, at first somewhat shaken by the commencement of an incendiary war, which mght set Europe in a flame, and whose progress has been arrested by the ceasing efforts of vigilance, moderation, firmness, and wisdom.——What is the situation of the enemy? The people are up in arms, and whilst necessity, seconded by genius, has led us to invent a new species of marine, necessity and terror have compelled the Cabinet of England to substitute in general the pike for the ordinary implements of war. This cabinet is divided betwixt projects of invasion, and projects of defence. It is lavish in useless entrenchments; it covers its coasts with fortifications; it erects and destroys its batteries without end; it makes experiments, whether it could not stop or turn the course of rivers. It plans inundations on its own fertile plains; the indolence of cities reigns in the fields; the turbulence of the country pants in its cities.——Ireland, the Indies, the shores, even England, are an everlasting and unbounded object of uneasiness. All that belongs to England is endlessly menaced by 1500 vessels which compose our flotilla, at present by sixty ships of the line, and by a valiant army commanded by the first generals in the world. Of all kinds of menaces, would not that of simple patience be the most terrible, which would enable us to persevere for ten years in this state of delay and of effort, which leaves to our active hostilities the knowledge and the choice of the place, the time and the means of annoyance.——These considerations, and this contrast should, in my opinion, have inspired the English government with the wise resolution of taking the first steps to prevent hostilities. It has not done so. It has left to the Emperor all the advantage of originating this honourable overture. It has given an answer, nevertheless, to the propositions that had been made to it; and if this answer be compared with the shamefully celebrated declamations of Lord Grenville in the year 8, I am ready to acknowledge, that it is by no means void of moderation and wisdom. I shall have the honour to read it to you. (*Here he read the Letter of Lord Mulgrave, see p. 258.*) The character that pervades this answer is vague and indeterminate. One single idea presents itself with some precision, that of having recourse to foreign powers; and this idea is by no means pacific; a superfluous interference ought not to be appealed to, if there be not a desire to embarrass the discussions, and to make them endless. The ordinary consequence of all complicated negotiations, is to exasperate the mind, to weary out good intentions, and to throw back nations into a war, become more furious from the vexation of an unsuccessful attempt at an accommodation. Nevertheless, on a question regarding a multitude of interests and of passions, which have never been in unison, we should not rest upon a

single symptom. Time will soon develope to us the secret resolutions of the government of England. Should these resolutions be just and moderate, we shall see the calamities of war at an end; should, on the contrary, this first appearance of accommodation prove but a false light, intended only to answer speculations of credit, to facilitate a loan, the acquisition of money, purchases, or enterprises, then we shall know how far the dispositions of the enemy are implacable and obstinate, and we shall have only to banish all hope from a dangerous lure; and trust without reserve to the goodness of our cause, to the justice of Providence, and to the genius of the Emperor.—Whilst expecting new lights to illustrate the obscurity of the actual state of affairs, his Majesty the Emperor has conceived, that the imperfect disclosure which his Majesty the King of England has thought proper to make of the first overtures of France, called for a full explanation on his part of all that he wished, of what he did, and, of the answer of the English government. At the same time he has commissioned me to make known to you, that he will ever feel a real satisfaction dear to his heart, in making known to the senate, and to his people, by frank, full, and unambiguous communications, every thing that shall be connected with the interests of its prosperity and its glory, on every occasion when such communication shall be consistent with the principles of policy, and the rules of discretion.

After the report, a member proposed an address to his Imperial Majesty, to thank him for this testimony of confidence which the senate had received in the communication of so remarkable and important a report; and stating, that pursuant to the practice of the senate on political questions, this subject should be referred to a special commission.——Messrs. Barthelemy, Cacault, Helouville, and his Excellency Marshal Perignon and M. Francois de Neufchateau, President of the Senate, were named as commissioners.

M. SEGUR'S SPEECH *in the Legislative Body of France, upon the subject of the Overtures of Peace to England. Dated 4th Feb.* 1805.

Gentlemen,——His Majesty the Emperor has wished you to be made acquainted by an official communication with recent facts interesting to our political situation. His Majesty, ever since he has been raised to the imperial dignity, has been of opinion, that this situation, and the circumstances which placed him in it, might naturally lead him to entertain hopes of peace. The enemy, undeceived with respect to the vain hopes which he had founded on the chances of an elective power, found himself in a situation which ought to dispose him to listen to more moderate counsels. The Emperor has done what Gen. Buonaparté did before the crossing of the Drave; what the First Consul did before he was forced to combat at Marengo; he has written to his Britannic Majesty the letter which I am about to read to you. (Here he read the Letter of the Emperor, see p. 257.) This letter, gentlemen (continued he), was suitable to the dignity of a power which relies on its strength, yet will not abuse it; the character of the Emperor not permitting the suspicion of weakness. To this letter the British minister returned an answer, not suitable to overtures so frank and so pacific, but an answer, the terms of which, at least, when compared with those employed in the year 8, in other circumstances, do not offend against decorum; and permit us to hope for communications of more utility. It is as follows: (Here he read the letter of Lord Mulgrave, see p. 258.) The letters and the answer would have remained among the secrets of government, like all preliminary acts, the object of which is to lead to effective negotiations, if the message (speech) of the King to his parliament had not called for its publicity. This message which announces that pacific communications had been made on the part of France is full of acrimony, accusations and reproaches. An insulting pity is feigned for a generous nation which has been suddenly attacked in the midst of peace, and whose ships, sailing under the protection of treaties, have been seized, pillaged, and destroyed. Yet astonishment is pretended that she should not have humbled herself by explanations with an enemy who has treated her as a robber, and that she has applied to hostilities by a declaration of war. It also announces connexions, a correspondence, and confidential relations with the powers of the Continent, to insinuate the idea of a coalition which does not exist, and which it will be impossible to realize. ——France is too great to condescend to return invectives; she owes to an ally, cruelly injured, not an useless pity, but the most constant and faithful support.—France has not an enemy on the Continent; she has no discussion with any continental power, which can attach it to the war of the British ministry, Austria, Prussia, the whole of Germany, wish for peace, and wish it with France. Even within these few days,

the Emperor has received the most positive assurances of their amicable dispositions.——The Emperor Alexander would have prevented the war, had England consented to accept his mediation: he would, perhaps, since have put an end to it, if his ministers at Paris and London had followed the intentions he then entertained. The intervention of Russia, extremely useful to prevent hostilities, cannot be equally so when it is proposed to terminate them. England has nothing to dread from the power of Russia, and does not conceive herself interested in observing certain measures with her. This is known to all Europe: the events of the year nine, have demonstrated it; the British government has proved it. If England at present wishes to derive advantage from some confidential communications, it certainly is not to manifest more pacific intentions; her aim is to gain credit for an apparent coalition. But she has no chance of success, and her hopes are illusory; for at Petersburg, as well as at Vienna, as well as at Berlin, the attack of the Spanish frigates in the midst of peace; the assassination in the midst of peace, of three hundred victims, immolated by the cannon of England, or buried in the waves. The capture in the midst of peace of the Spanish regiments, the detention in the Mediterranean of 80 vessels of all nations, and their perpetual violation of the liberty of the seas, are considered as an attack on the rights of nations and injurious to all sovereigns.——This correspondence, these confidential relations, are therefore only so many chimeras, idle pretexts to avoid negotiations for peace; such has always been the perfidious system which seeks to sow the seeds of war in the Continent, to enternize the monopoly of a single nation, and oppress the commerce of all others. It was this same spirit which to authorise the violation of the Treaty of Amiens, created in our ports imaginary armaments, and terrified the English nation with destructive projects.——If the voice of humanity be not listened to, those will be culpable who expose their country to dangers, which he whom they accuse of being the author of them, has constantly endeavoured to prevent. The enlightened politicians of all countries, the English nation itself, slowly undeceived, have blamed the blind obstinacy of the English government, when, in the year 8, it neglected a favourable opportunity which was offered it, to make an honourable peace; and, perhaps, the present greatness of France is a consequence of that false policy. The future will shew the efforts of a blindness so obstinate; and, perhaps, in ten years, our situation to treat may be still more advantageous. In war and in politics there are opportunities which never again recur, and which leave regret for ages, that they have been suffered to escape. If such be the destiny of England, it remains only for French bravery to display all its energy, and finally to triumph over that eternal enemy of the liberty of the seas, and the tranquillity of nations.

M. REGNAULT'S SPEECH *in the Tribunate of France, relative to the Overtures of Peace with England. Dated 4th Feb.* 1805.

Gentlemen,—The government of England, in publishing imperfectly the commencement of a negotiation with France, has violated the law of nations, and imposed on his Majesty the Emperor an obligation to make known to France and to Europe the circumstances of the case with all accuracy. ——Europe and France will observe to what fresh sacrifices of self love, of every sentiment of vain glory, a noble heart, full of pride, and jealous of its renown, has submitted, to order to spare the effusion of human blood, of the blood of his people more endeared to his love. They will perceive that the first warrior of his age has endeavoured to restore as soon as possible to peace and to repose, the existing generations, whose tranquillity and happiness from henceforth the dearest of his wishes, and will constitute the sole glory which he wishes to add to the glory already acquired of his military triumphs. These sentiments, gentlemen, explain at once the thoughts and the actions of his Majesty.—— And should it be asked how a man, gifted with a character more vigorous, who has proved himself more enterprising and more daring than the most daring and enterprising persons recorded in history; how a man, in the vigour of impassioned youth, could, in desiring peace, triumph at once over his remembrances and his hopes; how the general of five hundred thousand brave men could keep in subjection the most noble, as well as the most absolute of all the passions, that of renown;—how he could renounce the glory which he could still acquire in this career of arms, in which he has encountered only victories: it must be answered—this man has need of the repose and of the happiness of the world.—If one asks how a young monarch, incessantly pursued by cowardly enemies, attacked by vile defamers, menaced by assassins, silences his personal resentments, and resolves to present the olive branch to the cabinet that hires his defamers, and pays wages to his assassins, the answer is, this

monarch is above the passions of common men. If one recollects how Great Britain, braving public morality, and the law of nations, has prostituted her ambassadors, degraded her most distinguished soldiers, by the vilest functions, by the most shameful missions; if we consider how she employs the treasures of her commerce, acquired in contempt of the law of nations, and of all laws, to pay the fabricators of infernal machines, to organise conspiracies the traces of which are still in the midst of us, and which have excited cries of indignation that re-echo throughout Europe. If we trace out to ourselves such a picture, and ask how the chief of this great nation, marked by France and Europe as the avenger of so many outrages, stifles in his heart the malice and hatred which would prevail in an ordinary soul, we must answer, the man, to whom the great nation has given its crown, aspires from that moment only to the title of Father of the French.——Napoleon had scarcely ascended the throne, when he had scarcely gone out of this metropolis, where all that is most august in religion, had consecrated what is most solemn in the wishes of the people, when his heart still full of emotion at the public acclamation, inspired him with the thought of writing to Geo. III. the letter which I am charged to communicate to you. — The Emperor had very recently taken to France the sacred oath which the Almighty had accepted, to live for the happiness and the glory of the French people; and in order to enter upon the accomplishment of that holy engagement, he collected, set down, and addressed to the King of England, the expression of all the generous, moderate, and, if I may so speak, the religious sentiments that can be conceived and professed by a noble soul: and indeed, that immortal dispatch will not rank among the less glorious monuments of the reign of his MAJESTY; nor will it be the least certain of his titles to the gratitude and love of France; neither will it be the least secure pledge of the esteem of those wise philantrophists, who, in whatever light they may be represented by obscure and perverse men, by whom they are calumniated without being understood, still form so numerous a class in the bosom of enlightened Europe. But on this occasion may not the humanity of the Monarch have deceived his wisdom? Could his reason have long continued to cherish the hopes suggested by his benevolence? Had he forgotton how, and upon what perfidious grounds, the most sacred compacts had been violated? Had he forgotten, that when the leopards were tearing the Treaty of Amiens, no fiend of aggression had provoked their rage? Had he forgotten how, on the 8th March, it was stated to the Parliament of England, that our ports and our arsenals, though then in a state of pacific silence and inactivity, were filled with armed vessels, and holding out, in the state of their equipment, a most menacing appearance?—No, Tribunes; such recollections are not to be effaced; but since the æra that gave them birth, what happy changes have taken place in the attitude of France, attacked, as she has been, by imprudent and unjust enemies! —Is it necessary, Tribunes, that I solicit your attention to our internal situation, and to remind you of the strong pledge it holds out to you of security, strength, and well-grounded expectation? Were you not the first to interpret and express the national wish ratified by the suffrages of five millions of citizens, and since the accomplishment of that wish, since the establishment of the NAPOLEON dynasty, has for ever fixed the destinies of the French Empire! Was ever an empire more firmly founded? Never in any nation has the conspiring will and energies of the Government and of the People, created a mass of strength and power more imposing and more formidable! Never has any State advanced with more rapid strides towards prosperity and greatness! For these two years past, it is true, war with England has been declared, and no important occurrence has marked its progress; no decisive blow has been struck that can furnish any conjecture of its termination. But in our ports we have fleets; in harbours armed flotillas.—Of the four chances to be got over in reaching a descent, since, after all, we must utter that formidable word, three of them have already decided in our favour. The ships are built; they are collected together; and ports have been prepared to receive them. The whole advantage of the war has therefore been in our favour; since, without having experienced any check in the face of a superior enemy, we have employed two years in assembling together immense means. The whole advantage of the war has been in our favour, since, in spite of the numerous ships that cover the seas with the British flag, we have been able to provision and to place in a state of security our most important and most remote colonies.—Martinique, Guadaloupe, Cayenne, the cities of France, &c. &c. are furnished with every thing in abundance. Their garrisons have been more than tripled; all the stores and provisions intended for them have reached their destination. No reinforcement has failed to arrive at its intended place. A great

expedition would fail before Martinique and the Isle of France. And while our colonial territory remains entire and sheltered from every fear, the dominions of the King of England, (Hanover), is entirely in our power. We have lost nothing of our possessions, and we occupy an important province of the enemy.—What advantage have the English acquired to compensate for those advantages; what has availed these masters of the seas, the immense superiority of their naval strength. They have lost 15 ships or frigates, that have either ran on shore, or have been dashed upon the rocks. They have squandered away immense treasures in cruizes dictated by fear, interrupted by the power of the winds, and punished by storms and other mishaps. At home the English have seen the merchant forced from his counting house, the manufacturer from his loom, and for want of muskets, compelled to consume the time destined for their commerce and their work, in handling clumsy and unavailing pikes, hastily forged, by the dread of an invasion. Under the pressure of that fear, ever present to their minds, the English Government has had recourse to every possible means of defence; they have prepared inundations and batteries; they have barricaded their ports, and fortified their coasts; they have contrived flying carriages to transport their troops, and put into requisition the carriages and horses of the three kingdoms; they have purchased the arming of the English nation at the price of disorganization, the derangement of its habits, and the counteraction of its manners. The traveller who, for these two years past, goes from Paris to London, and returns from London to Paris, is astonished to behold in the capital of the French Empire profound peace and security established and maintained, and in the capital of England uncertainty and terror; the agitation that prevails at the head quarters of a threatened camp, defended by an incoherent, unorganized mass, novices in the trade of war, struck with the conviction of their own inability to make war against the veteran troops of Cæsar.—If we compare the state of opinion in some parts of the two countries, we shall behold in the Eastern departments of France that were in a state of insurrection, enlightened Prelates restoring peace to the public mind by re-establishing tranquillity in their conscience; vigilant Prefects founding a new and wholesome administration, arresting, disarming, and punishing the remnant of those brigands who were cast upon our coasts, concealed in our cities, or wandering in our forests. In those countries where not long since British gold was employed to kindle up civil war, agriculture is re-established, tranquillity is maintained, the taxes are raised without constraint, paid with punctuality. New cities are seen to rise; canals are dug; public roads are completed. The conscripts summoned to our armies, flock to them at the same call which so lately excited them to a sacrilegious war, but which now only collects them to invoke the blessings of Heaven in favour of the man that governs them. Nor do we see any extraordinary measures, any suspension of the ordinary protecting laws; no longer are there any dissensions between the Morbihan and the Côte d'Or, between La Vendee and the Meurthe.—In the mean time, at the other side of the ocean, Ireland presents to us the spectacle of never ending conspiracies, instigated by oppression as constantly renewed; an army of soldiers restraining with difficulty an army of citizens, by the aid of those violent measures, of which the revolution scarcely furnishes an example; and to concentrate all in one word, we behold in that unfortunate country a war of religion, persecutions unknown at this moment in the bosom of Europe, that it is indignant to observe, the only spot upon the earth where the most sacred rights are unacknowledged, and where government arms itself against the uncontrolable power, and the sacred freedom of conscience.—If, on the other hand, you draw a parallel between the finances of the two states, you will find on the opposite shore new expenses accumulating upon the expenses already immense; of a nation to whom a million and a half was yearly necessary in an ordinary war, and who, in the present war, stands in need for the first time, of a levy in mass; of a levy that costs it hundreds of millions. It provides for that sum, it is true: but by goading the present, and by swallowing up the future, by resolving to fund its debt, instead of being extinguished by the operation of its sinking fund, swelled by the abuse of its only resource, loans.—On our side, our numerous armies have been always the cause of our greatest expense; and their maintenance brings with it but an inconsiderable addition, that is not made to bear upon a foreign country.—The budget which will be shortly laid before you, will apprise you, that our territorial resources have provided for every thing; and that, instead of adding to our debt, during these two years of war, our sinking fund has begun efficaciously to operate for its extniction.—What France has done, she may continue to do for 30 years,

and has only to ask of Heaven that the sun may continue to shine, the rain to fall upon our fields, and the ground fecundize the seed deposited in it. Ten years more of war would make no addition to our debt; ten years more of war would add four milliards to the debt of England. Let her not forget, however, that if public credit be a powerful and formidable weapon, that the bow too strongly bent, snaps in the hand that holds it, and leaves naked and defenceless the man that employs it.—England, it must be owned, has plundered without risk during the first months of hostilities, from our unprotected ships, forty or fifty millions (livres) to the detriment of our commerce. But at Martinique, Guadaloupe, the Isle of France, every day sees our privateers carry in English prizes; and already the balance inclines in our favour in the calculation of our finances as well as in the comparison with our glory. —I may therefore say, and say it confidently, that the advantage is on our side. France is invulnerable in all the points of her immense territory; she has nothing to apprehend in her advanced ports in the West and East Indies. England is every where vulnerable; and without appearing to reach her, we have in reality inflicted wounds upon her, which may perhaps be attended with a progressive atony or violent convulsions.—Our fleets at Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort, have annexed to them armies, resolved to pass the ocean with them. Our flotillas are ready to depart with these proud sons of war, who know no impediments, because they have surmounted all that, before them, had astonished the most intrepid. Let us continue to keep on our coasts soldiers inhabiting camps instead of barracks, and become intrepid sailors as well as brave warriors. Let the people of England in the mean time, arm, agitate, fatigue, exhaust, and discourage themselves. Let our resources and our revenues suffice for our expenses, and let there be no want but that of some extraordinary resources which the richness of our country insure to us. In England, let the interest paid to loan-holders absorb, and exceed all possible means to pay those levies in mass, which exhaust the nation without defending it; let this state of things prolong itself, and let the English cabinet state the advantages that result from this situation, from which it derives equal danger and shame. Shall I speak to you of these secret expeditions with which the credulity of the English people is every three months abused, and which terminate only in ridiculous and fruitless attempts. Are they embarking some troops for the renewal of the garrison of Gibraltar, cut off by the pestilence; or do they wish to convey some troops to India, or some reinforcements to Ceylon, where England has had such losses; or do they prepare some millions of men to repair the ravages of the yellow fever at Jamaica, to strengthen the garrisons of the English colonies, threatened by three or four thousand men, which Martinique and Guadaloupe can detach against them. When these ordinary measures are in preparation, the government suffers it to be believed, that formidable armaments menaced France. How long and with how much mystery did they announce those ships loaded with stones, to choak up our ports, and those fireships so courageously, and at such a distance launched against our flotillas. And in fact what other expedition could tempt the English. Would they wish a landing on our western coast, to try how our national guards alone, united with our peace garrisons will receive them on their arrival, and cut off their return. Masters of the sea for two years, their fleets have fatigued the ocean and the Mediterranean, and their soldiers have not dared on any coast; on all our shores their vessels have thrown on them only brigands. In place of these vain phantoms of expedition, suppose gentlemen, that the 25,000 men from Brest, the 6000 from Rochefort, the 12,000 from Toulon, and the 25,000 from the Texel, all or even in part reach Ireland, Jamaica, or India; or even suppose that these 200,000 men the boats of our flotillas can carry and pass over in one night, menaces and reach the opposite coast, on which their impatient courage keeps them for so long a time; suppose, what is still more simple, that the 50 frigates, the sixty ships of the line, of all rates, which two years have seen created, armed, and equipped, should get out in small squadrons and inundate the seas, and dry up in every quarter the channels of prosperity and life; by the aid of which England supports its monstrous existence. With only a part of these suppositions realized, you will see every where; and reason will see also chances terrible, and without counterbalance, against England. It is therefore in the very consciousness of the strength of his people, and of his own power, that the Emperor found an additional motive for speaking the language of peace. It is with so many plans of campaigns, the success of which is probable, almost to certainty, inasmuch as that which is void of all danger, produces successes so real; it is with this vast and rapid glance which embraces the whole extent of his resources, and all the means of drawing them forth, that his Majesty has taken a step which would have

been shameful to a nation that had a different Chief—shameful for a warrior commanding another people. But could not this confidence of the issue of the war with England be disturbed by any uncertainty as to the state of the Continental relations of France. If there were any danger of that, what could his Majesty have hoped from a step taken under such circumstances; and the history of his life evinces that no man knew better how to seize the favourable moment. If a Continental war were impending, Napolean knew well that there was no other course than the terrible and necessary one of throwing away the scabbard of his so uniformly victorious sword, and to make glitter before the eyes of the world a new lance of Achilles; far from debasing the just pride of his fortune, to propositions dictated by fear, and suggested by weakness, and which would have promised but humiliation as their result. Happily, Gentlemen, in this respect of our exterior relations on the Continent, two years have produced assuring and honourable ameliorations. The taking possession of Hanover was necessary and indispensable. The Emperor willed, ordered, executed it. He did it to punish the perfidy of a rupture without declaration; he did it to secure to himself the means of compensation in a war, in which prudence may dread disadvantages, from which wisdom has preserved us; he did it to fetter the commercial relations of these dominators of the seas, who carry on commerce by war, and war by commerce. But this possession which, for the first time, carried and fixed our armies in the extremities of the North, might have alarmed the Powers most attached to our cause by their position, the most united to our fortune by their interests, the most faithful to our alliance by inclination. Difficulties did in fact arise, but the wisdom, the moderation, the confidence in the faith of the Cabinet of the Thuilleries, and its remoteness from every revolutionary and disorganising idea, dispelled all the clouds, and never have we had with Prussia relations better established, a correspondence more cordial, amity more intimate. On the other hand, if the changes that have been effected in the French Government, were called for by experience, pointed out by all men of sense, desired by the enlightened friends of the country, willed by the entire nation, no one could hope to operate it by the creating of a kingly monarchy; and the Imperial title might give rise to fears of discontent and coldness on the part of Austria. The discontent might become exasperated, and the coldness might degenerate to resentment by means of the intrigues of our enemies. Hence the incertitude as to the duration of a peace yet new and imperfectly settled. Hence the fear of seeing rekindled a desolating war, afflicting even for the conqueror. Far from our new institutions producing such lamentable effects, the Emperor of Germany and of Austria has seen, as he ought, in the establishment of the Imperial Monarchy, in favour of a new dynasty, a guarantee given to his Crown, and a motive for a closer alliance. It is in the organization of our empire that Francis the Second has found a new pledge of security and peace; a reason for removing his armies from our frontiers and those of our allies, and for not keeping his forces on a war establishment. In fine, from all the clouds which jealousy, hatred, fear, or hope had raised, nothing has resulted but happy explanations, solid assurances of the duration of peace, and the maintenance of harmony between the two Emperors.—Bavaria, Saxony, Hesse Cassel, Baden, Wurtemberg, the Elector of Ratisbon, all the reigning petty Princes of Germany, and the equestrian order have given his Majesty multiplied proofs of interest, attachment, and esteem. The Drakes, the Spencer Smiths, and the Taylors, have been driven away, as soon as it was known that their diplomatic character, shamefully profaned by them, served to mask the vilest and most odious proceedings, and that the object of their intrigues were war, which the present generation, fatigued with battles, and desirous of repose, wishes not to run into dangers, dreading, as it does, its misfortunes, and abhorring its exciters.—Having Prussia and Austria for allies, where, Gentlemen, are we to look for the elements of a continental coalition? Is it in Sweden? The young Prince who reigns over that State, endowed with a warmth of head and with an exalted imagination, (lamentable gifts for Kings when reason does not control them), has not known how to mature his designs by prudence, has neglected to call to his councils the sages with whom Sweden abounds, and to enlighten his experience by the wisdom of his old Ministers. Thus this Monarch has failed in the respect due to France, and in the effervescence of his resolutions he has kept no measures with her. But, at the same time, his imprudent boldness has not used more management towards Austria, and he has proved by the inconsistency of his conduct, that his prospects were without calculation, his prospects without maturity, his desires without reflection, and his passions without guides, he had meditated a treaty of subsidy with England. He had demanded of the Cabinet of St. James's 48,000,000

(livres) in exchange for 20,000 soldiers; but the English Minister trafficking for men in Europe as for merchandize in Asia, valued the Swedes like Sepoys, and would give but sixteen millions, and thus the treaty was not concluded.—Prussia beside interposed in the negotiation, declaring that the conclusion of it would be the signal for his entrance into Pomerania. And though the sage prudence of the cabinet of Berlin should not have defended the King of Sweden from his own errors, the blood of the Swedes does not belong to him who barters and sells himself to intrigue or to tyranny.—If France formed a pretension contrary to the interests and to the honor of Sweden, Stockholm would see the descendants of the soldiers of Gustavus arm for their country; but she would also find them irritated at seeing their blood set up to auction, exchanged for English guineas, and proving by their indignation, that the Swedish warriors, whose fathers filled the armies of Charles XII. are not made to stoop to such baseness and meanness!—Where then are the elements, the centre of this coalition to be found?—Will it be in Russia? The King of England himself announces that no tie exists with that power. He speaks of a correspondence, but a correspondence began is not an alliance concluded. Besides, Russia is a great power without doubt; but she can do nothing against the French empire. I go farther, if the Woronzoffs and the Marcoffs could entertain the idea of selling the force and influence of Russia to the English cabinet, Alexander has wiser counsellors, and forms more prudent resolutions. He has not forgotten how the Russians were last war treated by England, their ally, and how were terminated, in Switzerland and Holland, during the expedition undertaken by great generals and brave soldiers, but undertaken with plans that could not be executed under the influence of a disastrous star.—In fine the coldness between the cabinets of the Thuilleries and St. Petersburgh is not enmity. They have neither of them any real subject of misunderstanding, and what has passed within these three months between the two governments shews sufficiently that England would, in that conjuncture have conceived vain projects, and speculated upon false hopes, if she thought of converting her correspondence into a coalition. Woronzoff may have conceived such a hope; but who does not know that Woronzoff is less a Russian than an Englishman; that, residing in England, he wishes to fix himself there; and that a foe, and disapprover of Paul the First, he is equally so of the great Catherine.—The cabinet of St. Petersburgh is acquainted with the true interests of its country; it will have always before it the audacious insult of Lord Nelson, wishing to dictate laws in the Gulph of Finland. It cannot dissemble that the attack committed in the Mediterranean by the English against the Spanish frigates, against an almost unarmed regiment, against defenceless women and children, menaces also on every sea, the ships and subjects of the Czar. It cannot dissemble that that attack proceeds from the same spirit and the same principles that produced the attack upon Denmark, in her capital, which may produce an attack upon the Russian squadron in the Mediterranean, or in the Baltic; a spirit of fury and intoxication which pervading the English cabinet, induces them to despise all the powers of the continent, makes no allowances for any one, and consider themselves as of the social state, and the great civilised family of the world.—

—There exists, then, no threatening or possible coalition; but the sacred guarantee of the French empire against all fear, is, that could one have been formed, the emperor would have attacked, beat, and broken it; and after victory, would still have proposed peace; he would have written to the King of England that letter, in which he invites humanity to the aid of reason, and the interest of the English people. Let us repeat it then, gentlemen—one sentiment, and the most honourable of all, could alone have led the emperor to take the glorious step he has done with respect to England. This sentiment is the same which, in other situations, dictated to his Majesty the dispatch he wrote before the passage of the Saave and the Drave. It is the same that inspired that letter to the King of England, some months before the battle of Marengo. It is the same, that, after the victory, made the conqueror offer peace to Austria. In short, it is the same sentiment, which, at the peace of Luneville, made his Majesty resolve to sacrifice immense conquests, and upwards of 20 millions of inhabitants, who had submitted to the French arms. It is the love of social order, the love of the country, the sacred love of humanity, so often professed in vain speeches and so rarely carried into action, and which, always respected by the Emperor, always taken as the guide of his steps, has been the pledge and consolation of his success.—You will find, gentlemen, the touching and august expressions in the letter I am about to read to you. [He then read the letter, and Lord Mulgrave's answer, see p. 257, 258.] Shall I compare at present, gentlemen, the two monuments of what

history is already in possession? Shall I remark to you in the French document, elevation, frankness, and force; in the English, cunning, duplicity, and weakness? Here every thing wears a noble air, every thing bears the stamp of dignity and grandeur; warfare is menacing, but generous; warfare is menacing, but regulated by the guidance of that rare courage which sacrifices the charm of conquest, the splendor of victory, the illusions even of glory, to the cry of humanity, to the tears of a hundred thousand national or foreign families, who call out for peace to Heaven, and their monarchs. There every thing is uncertainty and hesitation, suppositions are given as answers to facts; the uncertain and equivocal future is opposed to the present; where no doubt exists; to a frank overture is opposed the possibility of a coalition, which, even did it exist, would neither intimidate the nation nor her Emperor; which whether it continues to act, or is vanquished, would neither encrease or retract their pretensions, neither add to or take from the conditions written down in the Treaty of Amiens. If in the communication which she seems to announce, England speaks a language more worthy of the overture she has received, peace may be restored. But if this only opportunity which seems to be offered by the Master of all Empires, of re-establishing the peace of the universe, is left unimproved by England, all Europe will see that the Cabinet of London only has desired, does desire, and will alone desire the continuance of war.—And if, on the answer by which the King of England, in the 8th year, rejected the noble overtures made by his Majesty, judgment be passed; if, with respect to the conduct of England, at that period, the present generation is, as it were, posterity; if a portion of the great prosperity of France, and of the crisis in which England is now placed, result from that refusal to enter into negotiation; I am warranted in thinking that a similar cause will produce similar effects; that a fresh refusal no less criminal than the former, will open to us new advantages; and that posterity, which, in this second emergency will pronounce upon the English Government, will also pronounce between the Emperor of France and the King of Great Britain; nor is that posterity far from us. If, on the other hand, so worthy and so honourable a use of the power with which the people have invested Napoleon the first, will call forth in the empire an unanimous sentiment of gratitude and love.—On that occasion, at least, we should be bound to give thanks to that British Cabinet, who, by the equivocal publicity given to this most candid of communications, has induced the necessity of that solemn explanation, of that unreserved declaration of the Emperor towards his people; we shall congratulate France on having acquired the proof, that by bestowing the throne on Napoleon, French citizens have given themselves a father, jealous of their happiness, sparing of the treasures of the state, and equally sparing of the blood of their children.

The President made the following reply: Gentlemen, orators of the government, the Tribunate have long shared in the sentiments of indignation which Europe must feel at the insatiable cupidity of the English government, who without daring to own it in a formal manner, attempt to number, among their prerogatives, the absolute and exclusive empire of the seas, and the right of arrogating to themselves the commerce and industry of all nations. We must not, therefore, be astonished that they elude every kind of overture of peace; that they multiply obstacles; that the most moderate propositions should appear to them inadmissible; and that their politics should be indecisive and uncertain. The government must be well convinced that the Tribunate will concur with all its might, and with all its influence, in the maintenance of the glory of the throne, and of the national honour, which has been thus insulted.

DUTCH FINANCE.——*Opinion of Mr. De Langer Van Wyngaarden in the Dutch Legislative Body, 24th January,* 1805.

It would be showing very little love for, or desire of the preservation of, our country and independence, if any man, for the purpose of carrying a favourite system or idea, should advise the rejection of a measure, which, in the present circumstances, is asserted to be the only one, and the speediest in its operation, for filling the public treasury, which is again declared to be empty to the very bottom, and without which immediate succour, the public administration is in danger of a total derangement. But, on the other hand, I must ask, Was not this to be foreseen long since? and why then suffer the time to be wasted in useless invectives on paper—and why not proceed to savings, and other means of finance? It is, at length, come to this; as soon as there is a pressing necessity, we are threatened with great calamities, as if it were to extort a consent for the prevention of that unavoidable stagnation, which has been so frequently declared.——But the most dreadful and unexpected consequences, such as those of

a bayonet or pistol clapped to the breast, compel us now to consent.——Are we only sitting here, to provide money for the public treasury, on every proposition and demand of the executive power, and to tax the inhabitants to that effect? Is the most unlimited power given or delegated to us merely for this purpose? and is not the greatest duty imposed upon us, to take care, in good time, that the inhabitants be not burdened and oppressed beyond measure? This is a very serious concern.——The motive for the present propositions is, the pressing demands of a contractor for the troops, who was kept waiting for payment until a million was due to him, and he had complained to the French general, threatening to stop his deliveries, consequently those of meat and bread for the French soldiers. So this Contractor and Co. hold in their hands the fate of the republic! Because our financiers have not chosen or not been able to satisfy them, they endeavour to obtain a new impost of one per cent. on property; the state directory, openly and without reserve, announcing a military contribution or quartering at the expense of the citizens, just as is practised in an enemy's country, unless we choose to agree to their proposal immediately.——To what extremes are they come! It seems as if they would reduce us to this, to demand another government, at the head of which some individual should be placed.——Financial impotency, and the derangement resulting therefrom, is ever the forerunner of the downfall of a government, and especially of such an unwieldly and expensive one as ours, which, staggering from day to day, tries to preserve its existence only by forced contributions; and which, as we are publicly told, must endure unheard of degradation, and lose its character both at home and abroad. Government wants again to carry the proposed contribution, by hurrying us, and without hardly allowing us time to give it a thought. It gives us to understand, at the same time, and as it were in the same breath, the insufficiency of the measure, which certainly will not answer the expectation, on account of the natural counteraction which may be expected. With some modification, it is cutting the pill into four pieces, and continuing to the very last, the cherished system of immoral and ruinous imposts on property, which not only clash with the constitution, but are also known beforehand to be insufficient, and that there will again be a deficiency; whilst in several cities the whole of that of 1803 is not all come in, and that of 1804 nothing is yet received. Whatever measures of coercion may be used, whatever detestable and unlawful means may be employed, to persecute those who should contribute, the petty or secret war against the finances increases in the same proportion as the pressure; the people can no longer endure it; they begin to feel, after having but too long performed their duty to their country with their purses, that the first duties of a husband and a father call on them to be careful, and make them swear to resist new extortions, and the dangers impending over their heads. I have long since thought this operation must stop, as it was only kept on foot in the hope and expectation of uncertain events. I have seen, during and since last summer, how obstinately, and without the least concession, the state directory, notwithstanding this assembly, endeavoured to preserve unanimity with them, (which is the best way to promote the greatest concerns of the state, especially in such ruinous and deplorable circumstances) thought proper to try to intimidate it by the most improper and preposterous menaces. This has caused the loss of much precious time, and a lamentable stagnation, with an almost irrecoverable loss of confidence, which has extended to several classes. The pressing demands of the great contractors for money arise not so much from a most urgent necessity (they, and their money-lenders, fare best at present), as from the consciousness that there is always a want of money, let ever so many contributions be raised. The petty contractors grow uneasy, because they are not paid; they calculate upon the country's paying the highest price for every thing; they gain 30 per cent. and more; hoard their cash; and, under pretence that the country does not pay them, they do not pay each other. On the other hand, the old monied men are dwindling away, and can scarcely support themselves; and do we not see, in our days, that some men who had nothing before the year 1795, have made rapid fortunes, and that those new acquirers excite, by their wealth, the envy of others!—One of the strongest marks of the oppression and misery to which the nation is reduced, especially by the contributions, is, that we do not, as formerly, hear one complaining voice, but that the public energy is deadened and palsied by the fear of foreign force, and the artifice with which we are constantly threatened, is most evident. Every body sighs in secret, and many, as privately as possible, begin to provide for their own safety; whilst some persons, who would otherwise have been as boisterous as ever, have been quieted by contracts, and opportunities have been afforded to others of spe-

culating to advantage.—If I were convinced of the reality of the necessity, and of the extreme urgency of the provision, and if such were the case, that the dreaded stagnation would come upon us unforeseen and unmerited; I should, from this moment, sacrifice my sentiments and my principles to these considerations, and agree, *that every thing should give way to public necessity*:—but as I know nothing of the secrets of the state, or why this measure is obtruded upon us with such precipitancy, I cannot consent to it as a consequence of the former contribution; and I must leave those to answer for the event, who, finding their interest in the different revolutions, have made engagements beyond what they are able to perform; who have suffered the public affairs to run on to such a hopeless state, and found it their interest that they should so continue.—On this occasion I find myself also obliged to protest against the continued injustice, by which the inhabitants of the Departments of Holland and Zealand, who contribute so considerable a part of every impost, are oppressed with respect to the collateral one; and against the deferring or with-holding of an indemnification to the Proprietors of East India Stock, who have now been kept so many years out of their property and their income.

DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPER.

THE KING'S PROCLAMATION *relative to the Quarantine. Dated at the Court at the Queen's Palace, the 6th day of February,* 1805.

Whereas alarming accounts have been received that the infectious disease (which, with a malignancy equalling if not exceeding that of the Plague, has occasioned a dreadful mortality in several parts of Spain, and in our town and garrison of Gibraltar) has spread and extended itself to parts of the coast of the Mediterranean; and whereas, from the season of the year in which it has continued its ravages in those places where it has already appeared, there is no good ground of confidence or hope that the comparative coldness and the temperature of the climate can afford any obstacle to its introduction and progress in our kingdom:——And, whereas, we feel it to be incumbent upon us to employ such means as under the protection and favour of Divine Providence, may be best calculated to guard our loving subjects against the visitation of so dreadful a calamity, we have thought fit, by and with the advise of our privy council, to issue this our royal proclamation; and we do herein, by and with the advice of our said council, most strictly enjoin and command all our loving subjects, and more especially those residing at any of the sea port towns, or in any other places on the coasts of this kingdom, whether they may themselves be liable to quarantine or otherwise, as they tender the preservation of their own lives, and the safety and welfare of all the inhabitants of this kingdom, most scrupulously to observe all the laws of quarantine which now are or may hereafter be in force, and all orders made by us, with the advice of our privy council, or by our privy council, under the authority thereof; and particularly most carefully to avoid any communication with any ship or vessel, or with any person or persons coming therein, from or through the Mediterranean, or from the West of Barbary, on the Atlantic Ocean, or from Cadiz, or other parts of Spain without the Streights, lying to the southward of Cape St. Vincent, or from any place to which, by our royal proclamation, by and with the advice of our privy council, or by our orders in council, the laws of quarantine are, or may hereafter be, extended; or with any boat, or person therein, coming from or having been on board any such ship, until such ship, vessel, or boat, with the crews and persons on board, and the goods, wares, and merchandizes imported therein, shall have performed their quarantine in such places and manner as are or shall hereafter be directed in that behalf, and until they respectively shall have been duly discharged therefrom: And we do further strictly exhort, enjoin, and command, all magistrates and persons in authority, and all others our loving subjects, without loss of time, to give information to us, through our principal secretary of state for the home department, or to our privy council, of any persons that they may know or believe to have offended against any of the said laws or orders; and we do hereby warn all persons whom it may concern, that we have given the strictest orders for enforcing, with the utmost rigour, the most punctual observance of the laws of quarantine, and all the orders, rules, and regulations relating thereto, it being our firm determination, upon serious consideration of the great extent of misery and calamity which a single instance of improvidently neglecting any of these regulations may bring upon our loving subjects, to cause the several penalties which the law has provided, or may provide, to be inflicted upon all those who may be guilty of any offence against

the same.——And whereas it is also necessary to take the utmost precaution to prevent the spreading of infection, in case the said malignant disease, or any other of a contagious nature (which God, in his mercy, avert!), should unhappily manifest itself in any part of our United Kingdom, notwithstanding the precautions taken to guard against the introduction thereof, we have thought fit, by and with the advice of our said council, to take measures for the establishment of a board of health, to consist of men able, learned, eminent, and experienced in the study and practice of physic, together with persons most capable, from their knowledge of the ports of our kingdoms, to afford assistance in the forming of regulations respectively applicable to the local circumstances of the said ports; such board to be authorized and directed to prepare and digest the best rules and regulations for the speedy and effectual adoption of the most approved methods of guarding against the introduction and spreading of infection, and for purifying any ship or house, or any place in which any contagious disorder may have manifested itself, and to communicate the same to all magistrates, medical persons, and others of our loving subjects, who may be desirous, and may apply to be made acquainted therewith; and we most strictly enjoin and command all magistrates and persons in authority, all medical persons, and others our loving subjects, especially those within the maritime counties, to give immediate notice to us, through our principal secretary of state for the home department, or our privy council, in case any person or persons should be attacked with any fever, attended with new and uncommon symptoms, such as to afford ground for apprehension that such fever is of the same nature as the disorder prevailing in several parts of Spain, and in Gibraltar, in order that the most immediate and effectual measures may be taken, as well for affording due and necessary assistance and relief to those afflicted with the same, as for preventing the contagion from spreading amongst our loving subjects.

BLACK REGIMENTS.

SIR,——I submit for insertion in your Register, some remarks on the policy of the West India black regiments. The public papers have not divulged the sentiments of government on the subject, it is humbly hoped the fanciful objections of short-sighted interest, will in vain raise impediments against the increase of that military establishment. Amidst the multitude of clashing notions, in which the expediency of such a plan is involved, truth may be wavering; but, the following are the suggestions which incline one towards the approbation of its policy. One of the most terrific objections is the state of St. Domingo, but its example is so heinous as to be rather a warning to regulate prudence by, than an occasion of alarm to a vigorous empire. The coronation exploit in Paris must subdue the most chimerical metaphysician to yield to doctrines which disavow theories of perfection, and recommend practical lessons of action modified according to "things as they are." Slavery is a monstrous curse, because slaves are hypocrites, cowards, and sensualists; yet, after allowing it to grow up to its present excess, since the reign of Queen Elizabeth, no practical man will pretend to advise its being uprooted by an instantaneous exertion. The wisdom of power can be expected to do no more than by restrictions and moderation, to temperate its acknowledged misery. The British government may with greater security than any other, rectify the abuses of such an institution, and apply it to any end of imperial utility by the power of its navy. Any of our colonial islands might be blockaded to starvation, by a very small fleet intercepting the supplies of provisions from America. The nation is palsied by dread of invasion, it forgets the navy filled with men fit for any service. The insurrection of slaves may be dreaded; the navy is again forgotten, which with a very few soldiers in the interior of each sugar island, is enough for every kind of protection. The war with Spain has laid open to hostility all the regions of Spanish America. It were madness to aim at lasting conquest, but surely the temporary possession of the principal towns and harbours, would assist with vigour in Europe to command a safe and honourable peace. Against the attainment of conquest in the West Indies is the pestilence, which destroys European troops. No effort of human skill can restrain the havoc of fever, and the labour of marching in that burning atmosphere is intolerable to white constitutions. At once presents itself the advantage of black regiments. Granting their use in one way, in another it is said their formation will hazard the safety of those colonies. The fear is causeless; but, it is asked if any remuneration of a commerce of luxury and not of use, can compensate the inglorious death of veterans, regiment after regiment. The supply re-

quired to fill up that waste, dries up the source whence armies might otherwise have this day been in existence on European ground, to vindicate the empire. By raising a few more black regiments, very small indeed will be the number of British recruits demanded for the colonies. For a few British troops will still be required there, but with greater means of bodily health, the black regiments being stationed on the sea coast, which not obnoxious to them, is most fatal to the white troops, whom this disposition will enable to be removed into the interior, which is most wholesome in air, and commanding in situation, being composed of almost inaccessible fortresses. Meanwhile the sea coasts are sufficiently watched by a few cruizers of the lowest class. Granting the reason of these observations, still will be objected the danger of arming the negroes. It is repeated, shall the army of the mother-country be exhausted to support an everlasting lazaretto? Are the objects of such excellent consequence as to deserve such sacrifices? Is it not of greater consequence to keep up the army at home; and to unite that wanted blessing with the easy safety of the West Indies, and more, the capacity of aggression against the tropical territories of the enemy, is any method so simple and certain as the increase of the black regiments? It is said the *safety* of the colonies; for, by the greatest imbecility only will that improvement in the military system, endanger the subserviency of the colonies to the mother-country. These regiments of blacks will be officered as at present they are, by British. The working slaves have no arms allowed them, and instances may be shewn, in which the black troops have willingly followed their officers against slaves in insurrection. By stationing them on the coasts, the communication or intercourse between them and the slaves may be entirely prevented. The militia of the colonies, though inferior in discipline and officers to troops of the line, yet individually is composed of few natives, but adventurers from those islands, whom poverty and daring spirits have carried from their native country not to forget it, but to measure every action by its fitness to accelerate their return to what they affectionately style *home*. They are habituated to the climate, and are loyal to the crown. The largest of the sugar islands has conceived an invincible jealousy against the admission of black troops; but that jealousy was produced by the want of faith which conveyed the first black regiment to that island; the circumstances are, I presume, at length in your Register, respecting the public transactions of Jamaica. Because it exists, it follows not that it is rational; and when a fair view is made of the state of the navy, by the assembly of that colony, the cruelty of devoting our soldiers to that horrid climate, and their own means of colonial safety when under the British ægis, their jealousy may subside or be confined to precaution. Were a list made out of the men, who sunk under the fever last war, of the troops transported to that climate, it would appear, entire armies have been swallowed up for sugar and rum expeditions, while the gallant, the gentlemanlike achievement of European warfare has been abandoned. There is a class of natives in the colonies which would serve admirably to fill up West-India regiments, the free negroes and free mulattoes, a race of men, agile, robust, and patient. Under British officers enough might be selected to over-run all Spanish America. That nation is the happiest and greatest which despises the preservation of conquests, but which is in an attitude to strike them with surety. With the most overflowing resources, we are as inefficient, as the mendicant United States, for war—whose end is peace, honourable, and lasting.

ANTIGOTHAM.

If Mr. Cobbett think the above worthy of insertion the writer will be obliged to him. After going thus far, he read in the Register of Saturday last, the Jamaica papers, containing the dissentions between that colony and the ministers. If Mr. Cobbett have not destroyed the manuscript of a paper inserted in a Register of July last, respecting the internal state of Jamaica, he will perceive that he did not print the most material passage, which related to a relaxation of the navigation laws, and an indulgence of unlimited intercourse between Jamaica and the United States, for a term of years, to enable that island to resist overhanging destruction. It was also added that, for a time, the restrictions, which prevented the cheap entry into the British harbours of the minor West-India productions, might be moderated, whereby their culture would be restored to a starving colony. Both these were omitted, which, proving the loyalty of Mr. Cobbett, inasmuch as the erasure implies the opinion of their doctrine being injurious to the empire, is contrary to that of their writer, who conceived their adoption the only means of re-uniting the life blood of that island, so essential to the general prosperity, in consequence of the immense British capital there, at hazard, independent of the shipping, manufactures, and population, a long course of

time has involved on its existence. On account of the non-residence in Jamaica of propriety of distinction and connexion, of the fashion of new-men to desert it on acquiring a fortune, all proceedings of ministers are unnoticed, and in obscurity. The eye is captivated with parade, the ear is entranced with the melody of eloquence; and necessity and reason unite to enforce passive obedience. One is struck with a note in p. 327 of De Lolme's Constitution of England; to sanction his sentiments of the thoughtlessness of ministers in general, he quotes the speech of the celebrated Count Oxengtiern to his son, who, expressing his diffidence of his own abilities, and the dread he felt of entering into public business, the hoary politician made this answer in Latin, "Nescis, mi fili, quam parvâ cum sapientiâ regitur mundus,—You do not know, my son, with what little wisdom the world is governed," of which maxim our sages seem to be perfectly convinced.

London, Feb. 12.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

THE BUDGET. ——This word always puts one in mind of the contents of the thing, of which, in its literal sense, it is the representative; and, upon no occasion, that I recollect, has this idea pressed itself forward with more force than at present.——Every year certain expectations are held forth; and every year they are disappointed. But, if the last year's promises are broken, ample amends is made by the new ones, which never fail to exceed the former, whether as to magnitude or solemnity.——Upon a complete view of the financial state of the country it would be useless to enter until the whole of the annual accounts were laid before parliament; but, the Budget, taking its statements, as to the past, for truth, enables us to settle a point or two, with respect to which there have been some dispute.—— The art of *financiering* consists principally in multiplying and confusing accounts, till, at last, no one has courage to undertake an examination of them. The way, therefore, to detect a financier of the Pitt school, is, to fix upon some one point, and that, too, a point as simple as possible in itself, and that will not very easily admit of being disfigured and confused. When my attention was first attracted to the subject of finance, it appeared to me, that a gross deception was played off upon the people annually; but, an annual exposition of every little wheel, peg and wire in the immense machine, would have been an endless task. I, therefore, fixed upon one single point, namely, the *Surplus of the Consolidated Fund*, and, upon this point I have steadily followed the "*two* "*first* financiers in the world" (as the SUN and the ORACLE call them) from the month of December 1802 to the present day. ——But, first of all, in order to render what I have to say intelligible, it may be necessary to explain what is meant by the words, *Consolidated Fund*. Who would not imagine, that it was a national resource already realised and set apart. In the common acceptation of the word *Fund*, it means something collected together. When we talk of a fund for the purpose of defraying any expense, we never suppose it to depend upon contingencies. If a man tells us that he has formed a fund for a certain object, we think him to mean that he has got so much money together; and, that there he keeps it apart for that special object. With this notion in their minds, the people, when they hear talk of the Consolidated Fund, think that the nation has a certain great fund, or stock purse; and, when they hear talk of the *surplus* of this fund, they think that the fund has grown beyond the demands upon it, and that they are in a fair way of becoming as rich as Jews. Whether any of them ever imagine, that they shall live to see the day when the overflowings will be distributed amongst them is more than I can say; but, that some of them, and those political writers, too, regard the consolidated fund as intended to defray all the expenses of the nation, will appear from the following passage of the Morning Herald, once before quoted. "From the official account of the income "and charges of the year (1803), it will be "seen, that the income amounted to "31,862,961 l. whilst the charges are only "26,700,533 l. leaving *a balance in favour* "*of the country* of more than 5 millions, a "circumstance without example in the "whole of our financial history!" And, indeed, who can blame people for adopting such notions? Why are not the accounts of the nation stated like the accounts of individuals? Why are words and even whole sentences to have a meaning, when applied to national accounts, different from that which they have when applied to the accounts of individuals? What is it that constitutes *cant*? And, what are the purposes for which cant is used?——Who would ever imagine, that, by the Consolidated Fund, was meant the money annually received at the Exchequer *for all the permanent taxes of the kingdom*; or, in other words, with an exception not worth noticing here, *the whole income of the nation*, war taxes now excepted? This *fund*, as it is called, is, by several

acts of parliament, appropriated to the paying of the interest upon the national, the expenses of the civil list, and the pensions and salaries granted by Parliament; and, what remains is called the *surplus* of the consolidated fund; which surplus, be it observed, is all that there is, except the war taxes, wherewith to meet the expenses of the army, the navy, the ordnance, and the miscellaneous charges, which four heads amount, this year, to 43 millions sterling, while the famous *surplus* amounts to only one million two hundred thousand pounds, leaving, of course, 41 millions to be raised by war-taxes and by loans; and, accordingly, we see, that 16 millions in war taxes are counted on, and we have seen a loan made for 20 millions. Why then confuse and puzzle men by talking about a *fund* and a *surplus*? "Oh!" Say the people of the 'Change, "but this fund is a very impor-"tant thing. It is appropriated, by acts of "parliament, to the payment of the interest "of the public debt: it is sacred and can-"not be touched. The stockholder is thus "secured by the law. Let come what will; "let who will go unpaid, he must be paid." What a farce is this! Just as if any one would, or could, pay the stockholder, if there were not wherewith to pay the army and the fleet! Yet does the mere notion, absurd as it is, prop up the faith of many; or, at least, amongst other notions, inspired by similar means, it tends to that end. The worst of it, is, that this sort of faith is of a nature exactly the opposite to that of faith in the religious sense of the word; for, it is the property of the latter to enable men to smile in their last moments, whereas, the longer the former is entertained, the more horrid will be the catastrophe.——Having, as well as the confusion of the statements will permit me, described the nature of the consolidated fund and its surplus, I have now to beg the reader's attention to the several estimates relative to the latter, made, at different times, by "the *two first* financiers in the world." In December, 1802, Mr. Addington estimated the future surplus of the consolidated fund, without the imposing of any new permanent taxes, at 7,845,000l. a year; but, in order to keep within bounds, he took it, in his ways and means, *only* at 6,500,000l. Upon the subject of this estimate, I said (Vol. III. p 614), "I assert, that, if the accounts of "last year be correct, the surplus for this "year will amount to only 4,974,654l. "Here, Sir, we are at issue. Time alone "can finally decide between us." Time did decide: the year ended, and the surplus was only 5,162,533l. Proving the gross fallacy of "the first financiers," estimate, the correctness of mine, within 187,879l. which, in such a sum as that in question is hardly worth notice.——The Budget, as it is very properly called, for last year, was brought forward in April, when Mr. Addington called upon the parliament to vote (and that they did so it is hardly necessary to say) 5,000,000l. as the surplus of the consolidated fund for the year 1804. But, we must take down his words here. "I now come to the "surplus of the consolidated fund, which I "estimate at 5,000,000l. I shall be ready, "*when called upon*, to state, why I do not "take it at so large an amount as in the last "year, and why it may be *fairly* taken at "5,000,000l. The House is aware, that "the produce of the consolidated fund, for "the last year, was calculated 6,500,000l. "but, *in fact*, it realised only 5,162,533l. "In five quarters it had produced 6,100,000l. "but in the three quarters following *it fell* "*below what I estimated it at.* I see no "reason *to impute blame* to myself for "having, upon these grounds, called upon "the House to vote 6,500,000l. I detailed "my reasons to the House, and *the House* "*approved of them!!!*"*. Thus, *silence* was, as, indeed, it ought to be, when accompanied with an affirmative vote, construed to mean approbation. A useful hint for those, who are disposed to suffer money votes to pass as mere matters of course!—— Another year has now terminated. From the moment the account of the last year's permanent taxes appeared, I ventured to state, that the surplus of the consolidated fund for last year would not exceed 2,000,000l.† I was deceived, for the other "*first* financier in the world," now has told us, that it produced 2,200,000l.!!! In doing this, however, he kindly endeavoured to cover the blunder of his brother financier, by attributing the deficit "to causes "which he could not but consider as *tem-*"*porary*, as it proceeded, in a great mea-"sure, from stock in hand, &c. &c." But, the misfortune is, that this is no more than a tame repetition of the excuses made by the other "*first* financier in the world," who, in his farewell budget-speech above quoted, said: "I *could* show, *beyond doubt*, that the "deficiency from the amount voted, has "arisen from the *suspension of the payment of* "*certain duties*, and the increase of draw-"backs, the amount of which may be *fairly* "added to the surplus of the consolidated

* See Parl. Debates, Vol. II. p. 353.
† Present Vol. Register, p. 223.

" fund. I, therefore, look forward to a pro-
" bable amount *next* year (that is to say the year just expired) of 5,000,000 l." * Now, however, we find, that, in spite of the addition of these suspended payments, so "fairly" added, the 5,000,000l. have dwindled down to 2,200,000 l. as was, at the time, predicted. —— Mr. Pitt has now estimated the surplus for the present year at 4,000,000l.; but, unless the war taxes fall off in a proportionate degree, or, unless money depreciates still more rapidly than it now does, I venture to predict that there will be *no surplus at all*, other than what may arise from new taxes, or war taxes brought into the consolidated fund, and thereby leaving a larger sum to be provided by loan.—Here, then, we have a quite satisfactory proof of Mr. Addington's skill and foresight, when, in such lofty strains, he congratulated the parliament and the nation upon the " *growing* produce of the consolidated " fund." The speech, here alluded to, he afterwards published in a pamphlet, a pamphlet which, upon a more extended view of the subject to which these remarks belong, I may take the liberty of quoting somewhat at large. He said, that his statements were made upon " the most mature deliberation;" that he had " carefully and minutely exa-
" mined all the facts upon which his estimates
" were founded;" and, let it be observed, that, in the next month of June, (1803,) after the war had begun, he repeated his statement in this respect, and said: " The
" *growing* produce of the consolidated fund
" is likely to *increase*." He accordingly included it in his ways and means at 6,500,000l. I beg the reader not to forget that this was *after* the war had begun; and, that, therefore, no excuse can be grounded on a change in the situation of the country. —— *Grow* the surplus does, indeed, and very fast too; but, as the old women say of stunted children, it is downwards, like a cow's tail. First it was estimated at 7,845,000 l. At its first start it reached 6,500,000 l.; but this was a sort of Midsummer shoot. The next spring brought it to 5,100,000 l.; and the next, to 2,200,000 l. Observe, too, that this is the progress of the *falling off in the permanent taxes*, amounting, at the end of two years, to more than 5,000,000 l. in the year, to which must be added more than 1,000,000 l. for depreciation of money, according to Mr. Pitt's own declaration, during his speech upon the civil list. † —— Upon the subject of the *loan*, it is impossible to refrain from observing, that we hear now again all the set phrases of congratulation, which we have heard repeated in every budget speech for the last fourteen years. It is always such an *excellent bargain* for the public! One may here exclaim with Condorcet: " *qu'il est*
" *bête cet être moral qu'on appele publique!*" It is, too, always a bargain *equally excellent* for the loan-jobbers! Mr. Addington never failed to say so, and his brother in finance has now repeated the saying in terms stronger than ever. But, a trifling circumstance seems to have been forgotten, namely, that, during this war we were to have *no loans*, at least not exceeding 6 millions a year! This is another case which calls on us to recur to their very words. " The committee," said Mr. Addington in his budget speech of 13th June, 1803, " will perceive, that the great
" object I have in view is, to raise a large
" part of the supplies within the year. The
" extent, to which I wish to carry this prin-
" ciple is this, that there shall be *no increase*
" *whatever of the public debt during the*
" *war*. In the first place it will be neces-
" sary to ascertain the probable amount of
" the annual charges during the war, and
" then to make provisions for carrying on a
" vigorous and even *protracted* contest,
" without making any greater addition to
" the public debt, than what will be an-
" nually liquidated by the Sinking Fund.
" The annual charge of the war, unless de-
" mands should be made upon us by the in-
" tervention of foreign powers who may wish
" to make a common cause with us, I think,
" *will not exceed 26 millions*. I do not
" deny that this is a great, an enormous,
" sum; but certainly not greater than the
" value of the object for which we have to
" contend. If, then, the House think pro-
" per to adopt the measure I am now pro-
" posing; if I am right in my estimate of
" the growing produce of the consolidated
" fund, which I have considered at about 6
" millions and a half, and if my calculation
" of the annual taxes be correct, which I
" have estimated at 12,500,000 l. but, which,
" for this purpose, I will only take at
" 10,000,000 l. there will only remain a
" sum of 6,000,000 l. to be borrowed,
" which will be more than covered by the
" sinking fund, which now *produces* con-
" siderably more than 6,000,000 l. The
" *growing* produce of the *consolidated fund*
" is also likely to increase, unless we are
" again visited by those calamities by which
" the country has been afflicted. If, then,
" my calculations are correct, we shall be
" able to meet a war expenditure of 26 mil-
" lions, without any increase to the public

* Parl. Debates, Vol. II. p. 353,—† Ibid. 905.

" debt, an object so desirable that no differ-
" ence of opinion can be entertained upon
" the subject. I trust, therefore, this sys-
" tem will be adopted. It is one which has
" been before tried, and of which the effect
" is known. It has inspired confidence at
" home, and created *respect abroad*. But,
" the pecuniary effect is not all. It will be
" a difference in another respect: the dif-
" ference between a temporary and a per-
" manent tax. It will have another effect
" also; that of *convincing* the enemy of this
" country, that it is *hopeless for him to con-*
" *tend with our finances*; that it is not in
" his power to affect us in that respect. It
" will have a still further effect; that of
" *convincing* the other powers of Europe,
" that they may safely join with us in a
" common cause of resistance against the
" common enemy; for, that the resources
" of this country are such as to give full se-
" curity for the punctual discharge of any
" engagement it may enter into, and this is
" an object for which I have in view some
" provisions."—— Now, all this is proved to have been false. Completely false. The surplus of the consolidated fund has continued to *decrease*; the war taxes have not produced more than *half the amount* which they were, by this time, to have produced; instead of 6 millions a year, we borrowed 10 millions in 1803; in 1804, we borrowed 14 millions; and, this year we have already borrowed 22 millions and a half; the war expenses, instead of 26 millions a year, are already risen to 43 millions, while 5 millions only are pretended to be provided for subsidies, and while nothing has been voted by parliament on account of those visitations of scarcity, to which "the *first* financier in " the world" thought proper to allude. At the time that the above flattering picture was drawn, even at an earlier period, the following opinion was given in the Register: " We cannot estimate the total of the na-
" tional expenditure of the present, and of
" every future year, even of this sort of
" warfare, at less than 60,000,000l. There-
" fore, however the man of finance may de-
" fer his loans; by whatever act he may
" hide from our eyes the path to bankruptcy,
" the loans must come at last, or, in one
" shape or another, the national debt, or ra-
" ther the amount of the interest annually to
" be paid by the people on account of that
" debt, must go on increasing." The same was said, and, perhaps sooner, by Mr. Johnstone, whose predictions relative to the expenses of the war and the amount of the loans are now all completely verified.—— The circumstance, then, that of making no addition to the debt during the war; the circumstance which was to work such wonders, that was to inspire confidence at home and respect abroad, that was to *convince* our enemy of the hopelessness of a contest against our finances, has proved an abortion. What our enemy may *think* upon the subject, must, perhaps, be left, to be discovered of those, at whose disposal the parliament leaves about 200,000l. a year of secret service money; but, what he *says* we know as well as they. " If," says REGNAULT to the Tribunate, " you draw a
" parallel between the finances of the
" two states, you will find upon the op-
" posite shore new expenses accumulating
" upon the expenses already immense; of
" a nation to whom a million and a half
" sterling was yearly necessary in an or-
" dinary war, and who, in the present
" war, stands in need, for the first time,
" of a levy en masse; of a levy that costs
" it hundreds of millions of livres. It pro-
" vides for that sum, it is true: but by
" goading the present, and by swallowing
" up the future, by resolving to fund its
" debt, swelled by the abuse of its only re-
" source, loans. On our side, our nu-
" merous armies have been always the
" cause of our greatest expense; and their
" maintenance brings with it but an in-
" considerable addition that is not made
" to bear upon a foreign country. The
" exposition, which will be shortly laid
" before you, will apprise you, that our
" territorial resources have provided for
" every thing; and that, instead of adding
" to our debt, during these two years of
" war, our sinking fund has begun efficaciously to operate for its extinction.
" What France has done, she may con-
" tinue to do for 30 years, and has only
" to ask of Heaven that the sun may con-
" tinue to shine, the rain to fall upon her
" fields, and the ground fecundize the seed
" deposited in it. Ten years more of war
" would make no addition to our debt;
" ten years more of war would add four
" milliards to the debt of England. Let
" her not forget, however, that if public
" credit be a powerful and formidable
" weapon, that the bow too strongly bent,
" snaps in the hand that holds it, and
" leaves naked and defenceless him, by
" whom it is employed. Our fleets at
" Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort, have an-
" nexed to them armies resolved to pass
" the ocean with them. Our flotillas are
" ready to depart with these proud sons of
" war, who know no impediments, because
" they have surmounted all that, before

" them, had astonished the most intrepid. " Let us continue to keep on our coasts " soldiers inhabiting camps instead of bar- " racks, and become intrepid sailors as " well as brave warriors. Let the people of " England in the mean-time, arm, agitate, " fatigue, exhaust, and discourage them- " selves. Let our resources and our re- " venues suffice for our expenses, and let " there be no want but that of some ex- " traordinary resources which the riches of " our country insure to us. In England, " let the interest paid to loan-holders ab- " sorb, and exceed all possible means to " pay those levies en mass which exhaust " the nation without defending it: let this " state of things prolong itself, and let the " English Cabinet state the advantages " that result from this situation, from " which it derives equal danger and shame." If, then, the enemy be " convinced," as Mr. Addington said he would, of the hopelessness of a contest against our finances, it must be allowed, that he very well understands the art of disguising his conviction; for, the projects of invasion apart, he *seems* to be fully convinced, that a very few years of war must reduce our finances to the last extremity; and, if such be his conviction, I am afraid, that, *if the present system be pursued* (mark the qualification) he is but too good a judge of our situation. In short, and to draw to a close of these remarks upon the loan, it is, in my opinion, now clearly established, that, as long as the interest, without a deduction greater than what is laid in the shape of tax upon other income, continues to be paid upon the national debt, so long, whether in war or peace *we must continue annually to make loans.* This is the sentence now irrevocably passed upon the nation; and, the only question for the fund dealers, is how long she can go on borrowing. That she must continue to make loans, if she continue to pay the interest upon the debt, who, that but casts his eye upon her expenditure, as compared with her income, can doubt. Her whole expenditure now, for a year, is 70 millions. Next year it will be 80 millions, or very nearly approaching it. But, suppose it to remain at 70 millions; her revenue does not surpass 45 millions, even with the additional taxes. Suppose the war to continue 5 years longer; the annual amount of the *interest of the debt* will be nearly 40 millions. Where are the taxes to come from? The whole permanent revenue does not at this time, and will not this present year, amount to more than about 30 millions. Will the war taxes be rendered permanent? What, then, is to be done? But suppose the war to end with the present year. We well know, that it requires a year's war expenses to wind up; and that would raise the annual interest of the debt to 30 millions, absorbing the whole of the permanent revenue. Again I ask, then, what is to be done, unless we render the war taxes permanent? But, even that would not do; for who is there foolish enough to suppose, that 15 millions a year, allowing the war taxes to yield so much, would suffice for the maintenance of a peace establishment such as that, for which, in future, we should have to provide? Never more, therefore, while we continue to pay the interest upon the debt, shall we see a year pass over our heads without the government being compelled to make a new loan. These loans will be constantly adding to the debt; a circumstance of no importance, if it was not attended with that of a constantly increasing amount of *the interest*, which the people will be annually called on to pay in taxes. I am aware, that money will continue to depreciate, because it is quite impossible, that, while the funds last, the paper should ever be replaced by a currency of intrinsic value; and, I am also aware, that, as the interest of the debt will, of course, be paid in this depreciated money with an adherence to the nominal amount, the real amount to be drawn from the people will not increase to the same extent as the nominal amount; but, the increase of the real amount must still go on very rapidly; for, whenever the depreciation begins to be so considerable as to counteract the effect of the increase of the interest upon the debt, away goes the bubble in the twinkling of an eye.——So much for loans. The *new taxes* next demand a few remarks. A tax, supposing it to be unobjectionable in other respects, is good in proportion to its productiveness compared with the expenses of collection; and, in this light, the tax upon letters is excellent, because the expenses of the post-office must be nearly the same, whether there be a tax collected or not. As to the additions made to this tax, they cannot be complained of, seeing that they have by no means kept pace with the depreciation of money, and that, therefore, people will not, in *reality*, now pay for their letters at so high a rate as they did twenty years ago. According to the *scale* system, however, it is hard to conceive any thing more unfair than the letter-tax. In imposing the tax on servants, on horses, on dogs, on windows, &c.

care is taken (with what wisdom I do not pretend to say) to raise the tax upon each dog, &c. in a certain proportion to the number of dogs kept by any one person; but, the letter-tax is a perfect leveller, making a labourer, who only receives one sheet of brown paper in a year to let him know that his son or daughter is alive, pay just as much as is, for one letter from the same distance, imposed upon a loan-jobber, under whose dispatches the mail-horses come daily sweating from every part of the kingdom. I do not speak of this as a hardship upon the labourer, but mention it merely to show, how idle it is to pretend to regulate taxation upon principles like that of the *scale*. I was glad to hear Sir Robert Buxton propose the abolition of the privilege of franking; not because I agree with him; but because the proposition and the sentiments by which it was accompanied, must certainly be considered as an earnest of the honourable Baronet's conduct with respect to those who may be, at any time, proved to have been guilty of robbing the public.——The tax upon draught horses has been censured, and, it is to be sure, consummately ridiculous to tax implements of husbandry with one hand, while a bounty for the encouragement of husbandry (which bounty comes out of the taxes) is held out in the other! But, as to the tax itself, there does not appear to me to be any objection against it, which would not equally well apply to all the rest of the assessed taxes. What is it to the farmer whether he pays the tax for his windows or for his horses? Light in his house is as necessary as horses are in his fields. Besides, where does the tax finally fall? Is it not evident that it falls upon the consumer of bread and meat? Is it not evident, that, in supporting it, the farmer will only share, in a very fair and exact proportion, with every other class of people? The apprehensions, therefore, of that patriotic and pains-taking gentleman, Sir Robert Buxton, that the tax will turn arable fields into meadows (with or without the help of moisture), are, I trust in God, entirely groundless!——Whether the additional tax upon salt be particularly objectionable, or not, must depend upon its produce compared with the expense of collection, or upon some circumstance other than that of salt being one of the first articles of the necessaries of life, and, of course, forming part of the consumption in the family of every poor man; which is the only objection that I have yet heard urged against the tax upon it. If this objection be good, will it not bear equally strong against the tax on beer and on the things of which beer is made? I shall be told, perhaps, that while the rain and the dews fall and the earth teems with springs, men *may* live without beer, and that women and children *may* live without milk. They *may*; and so they *may* without salt, as the American Indians now do by choice. Nay, they *may* live without bread. But *will* they? And, are not bread and milk and butter and cheese and meat taxed? Yes, and that too very heavily in the taxes on land, houses, windows, and income; taxes which seem, in general, to be regarded as falling exclusively upon the rich. When we recollect, that, ever since the system of taxation began in this country, the imposers of taxes have constantly professed to tax the rich as much, and the poor as little, as possible; and when we see, that, at the end of a hundred years' taxing, the rich are richer and the poor poorer than ever; when such is the evidence before us, is it not astonishing, that we should still be the dupes of those who, by laying taxes immediately upon the rich, profess to *spare* the poor? Such persons however, to give them their due, are, in general, deceived themselves, as well as the deceivers of others. In short, I cannot help thinking, that all these objections to taxes because they weigh upon the poor, proceed from the want of a more general and enlarged view of the subject, whence men would easily perceive, that all taxes, be they what they may, must finally fall upon labour, labour being the only source of the means of paying taxes.—Some taxes are, however, more partial in their first operation than others; and, in some cases, they totally ruin one part of the community in working their way into general diffusion. Others are particularly objectionable on account of the mode of their collection. When they employ too many hands in proportion to their produce, and thereby not only cause a serious deduction from the productive labour of the country, but take the food from those who are employed in productive labour and put it into the mouths of those who do nothing that is profitable to the state, they are very injurious. The mode of collection may be odious and vexatious; as where it authorises a set of officers to call you before them; to keep you from day to day dancing attendance upon them; to treat you as a creature at their command; to scrutinize into the state of your concerns; to examine the depth of your purse; to overhaul your books and accounts, your deeds, leases, mortgages and bonds; to ascertain the state of your debts and credits; to remand you, and to call you up again at their pleasure. If, under such a

system of taxation, a man can be said to be a *free-man*, I should be very glad to know what it is that would make him *a slave*. But, even all this is more congenial with my ideas of freedom than the exercise of those powers which, in America for instance, are given by the excise laws. Count over the houses in the streets of any city or town, and you will find, that, into every fourth house, or thereabouts, an *excise officer has*, (or at least had when I was in the country) *at all times a right to enter, and range about in despite of the owner*. Many of them the excise officer never quits, without first putting his lock, or his seal, upon some part or other of the building; which lock or seal to break, or even to *touch*, the owner of the house trembles but to think of; and, if, by any accident, or by any temptation, he should have swerved from the limits prescribed to him; nay, even if suspicion fall upon him, he hastens to prostrate himself at the feet of him, whoever he may be, that happens, in the instance, to represent the dreadful ministers of Excise. If his supplications and all other means of mollifying fail, swift ruin awaits him. He is instantly shunned by his friends; the mark of destruction is set upon him; first a jail and last a poor-house are his lot. This terrible system it was against which the people of Pennsylvania so strongly remonstrated. It is said, that the excise laws have been repealed, and that the system has been completely abolished, under the administration of Mr. Jefferson; if so, it is no wonder that he has been re-elected by the unanimous voice of the people. The Pennsylvania people, in one of their representations, said: "What is our situation? "Our houses, regarded, in our law books, "as our *castles*, are entered, at pleasure, by "persons who come with an authority from "our rulers to force their way into and "about them, if we dare to resist. The "quantity of our liquor, the dimensions of "our vessels, are ascertained by these bold "intruders, who may come and break in "upon our repose at any hour of the night; "who affix their locks and their seals to our "doors and our utensils; who act the part "of inquisitors, in the most odious manner; "who set neighbour to watch neighbour, "who make one defray the expense of keeping the other as a spy upon his actions; "who, in short, seem intended for no other "purpose than that of raising money upon "us, in order to pay one for keeping another in subjection, and thus to render us "in reality a nation of slaves, suffering us "to retain the forms of freedom merely to "disgrace it." Of the excise-laws in this country I know little or nothing; but, that they are, in their operation and effect, very far indeed from answering the above description given of the excise laws in America, I must, of course, be perfectly satisfied; because, were they not so, it is impossible that I should never have heard any thing said against them in parliament.—With respect to the addition to the Income Tax I have nothing to say that I have not already said. My objection is not to the amount of it; not to its unfairness; not to the place on which it finally falls; but, to the effect which it has in checking industry and economy. It is, in the first instance, a tax upon these two virtues, so useful to individuals as well as to the state. As far as relates to the funds, however, I must acknowledge, that this tax did not originate with either of "the two *first* financiers in the world," but with that celebrated person, Mr. Thomas Paine! After having proposed the *abolition of the monarchy*, he proceeds thus, in the Second Part of his Rights of Man: "Reasons are already advanced in this work, "shewing, that, whatever the reforms in the "taxes may be, they ought to be made in the "current expenses of government, and not "in the part applied to the interest of the "national debt;" for, says Thomas, who was a firm stickler for the funds, "It is now "too late to enquire how the debt began. "Those to whom it is due have advanced "the money; and, whether it was well or "ill spent, or pocketed, is not their crime. By "remitting all the taxes of the poor" [quite a *first* financier!] "they will be totally relieved, and all discontent on their part will "be taken away; and, by striking off such "of the taxes as are already mentioned, the "nation will more than recover all the expense of the mad American war. There "will then remain only the national debt as "a subject of discontent; and in order to "remove, or rather to prevent, this, it would "be good policy in the stockholders themselves to consider it as *property*, subject "like all other property to bear some portion "of taxes. It would give to it both popularity and security, and as a great part of its "present inconvenience is balanced by the "capital which it keeps alive, a measure of "this kind would so far add to that balance "as to silence objections. This may be done "by such gradual means as to accomplish all "that is necessary with the greatest ease and "convenience. Instead of taxing the capital, the best way would be to *tax the interest* by some progressive ratio, and to lessen "the public taxes in the same proportion as "the interest diminished." [We have not been

able to act, as yet, upon this latter suggestion.] "Suppose the interest was taxed one half-"penny in the pound the first year, a penny "more the second, and to proceed by a cer-"tain ratio to be determined upon, always "less than any other tax upon property. "Such a tax would be *subtracted from the in-"terest at the time of payment*, without any "expense of collection. One half penny in "the pound would lessen the interest and "consequently the taxes, twenty thousand "pounds. The tax on waggons amounts to "this sum, and this tax might be taken off "the first year. The second year the tax on "female servants, or some other of the like "amount might also be taken off, and by "proceeding in this manner, always apply-"ing the tax raised from the property of "the debt towards its extinction, and not "carry it to the current services, it would "liberate itself." That the "two first "financiers" in the world have not followed this latter part of Mr. Paine's advice we know; but, I am sure it will not be denied, that to tax the funds, and the way of collecting that tax, were first suggested by him. Paine was a lover of traders and fund-dealers. He hated the legitimate aristocracy and the church, because they were, he clearly perceived, the principal supports of the throne; and, therefore, we always find him railing against the landed interest, while he is, as is above-shown, very lenient towards the fund-holders. With regard to the title to the crown he goes back as far as the conquest by William the Norman; rigidly inquires into the rights founded upon that conquest; and maintains that no length of time or other circumstance, impairs the right of the people to choose whether they will adhere to their sovereign or not. But, when he comes to the national debt, quite another set of principles seems to have entered his mind. "It is now *too late*," says he "to "inquire how the debt began!" I am of a very different opinion. The two first financiers in the world have my hearty thanks for taxing the funds in a proportion equal to that of other property; and, though I think they have done tolerably well for a beginning, and are going on very well, I cannot help saying, that they would have pleased me still better if they had, at once, imposed a much heavier tax upon the funds than upon other property. Twenty-five per centum upon the interest of the national debt would not have been too much for the first year, to which an addition of five per centum might have been added every year during the war; and then, as Mr. Addington said, "our "*burdens* would have been *lightened* in "proportion to our *pressure*." All in good time, however! If the war continue three years longer, we may live in hopes of seeing something of this sort adopted. —— Here, for the present, I should take my leave of this subject, did I not, upon recurring to the opinion which seems to be entertained as to the effect of taxing draught horses, think it of some importance to offer a remark or two upon a circumstance which appears to me a much greater impediment to agricultural industry than all the taxes upon the property of farmers put together; and that is the reluctance which has, for several years last past existed, to the *granting of leases*. This circumstance was mentioned once before, but I cannot refrain from again bringing it forward, when I am upon a subject with which it is so closely connected. Most of my readers know, that, since the commencement of the administration of Mr. Pitt, there has been established a certain department, called the Board of Agriculture. This Board, which has a Peer of the Realm for its president, is composed of persons profoundly skilled in the qualities of soils, in the divers arts of planting, sowing, drilling, dibbling, ploughing, reaping, and mowing. They study the science of breeding and feeding cattle and sheep; of fatting hogs; and of promoting propagation amongst the various sorts of these our fellow creatures, for whose comfort and happiness the Vice Society and the Benches of Justices have shewn so tender a solicitude. Well, this Board, of which Arthur Young, esq. F.R.S. is the Secretary, have taken particular pains to ascertain the agricultural state of the several counties of the kingdom. To this end they have sent out several persons to make actual surveys; and, indeed, it appears from the accounts of the Board, that, in these surveys, no trifling sums of money have been spent, the annual charge to the public on account of the Board and its proceedings being about 3,000*l*. The persons thus sent forth have made their reports to the Board, which reports have been published at the public expense; and as they have come forth under the sanction of so respectable a body, instituted too, by Mr. Pitt himself, there is no one, at least no friend of Mr. Pitt, that will, I should think, venture to question the facts which they state. These surveyors, then, all agree, that the greatest impediment to the agricultural industry of the country, is, *the refusing of leases to farmers*, and compelling them to cultivate, if at all, upon the tenure of a single year. Mr. Young, in his gene-

ral View of the Agriculture of Hertfordshire, says: "I am sorry to observe, that a *preju-* "*dice* against granting leases, *increasing daily*, "will, if not checked by the good sense of "the landlords, injure, beyond any calcula- "tion, the agriculture of the kingdom." Mr. Kent, in his agricultural survey of Norfolk, says: "that leases are the *first*, the "*greatest*, and most rational encouragement "that can be given to agriculture, admits "not of a doubt in my opinion. But of *late* "*years* there are very *strong prejudices* enter- "tained against them. In many counties," continues he, "the *prejudice* is so strong that "an owner would *as soon alienate the fee sim-* "*ple of his estate* as demise it for a term of "years. It grieves me," says he again, "to go "into a country, which I often do, and find "it almost in a state of nature, because the "soil being wet and expensive to cultivate, "the tenant cannot afford to do it without "encouragement, and the owner's *insur-* "*mountable objection to leases* keeps him from "granting the sort of encouragement which is "essentially necessary." Another writer, Mr. Middleton, says, in his View of the Agri- culture of Middlesex, "It is, without doubt, "a most *unreasonable prejudice* which many "proprietors entertain against granting leases "of their estates; for the with-holding these "certainly operates as a most powerful bar "against every improvement." And after a long discussion of the subject, he adds, "leases appear to me to be of so much im- "portance, as being perhaps the most power- "ful and rational means of promoting im- "provements in agriculture, that I hope I shall "stand excused for having entered so fully on "this branch of the report."——Here, then, is something worthy of the serious attention of parliament in general, and of Sir Robert Buxton in particular. Here is an official re- port, or, rather a concurrence of official re- ports, from persons paid by the government to inquire into the state of the agriculture of the kingdom; and the information it commu- nicates, is, First, that leases are the first, the greatest, and the most rational encourage- ment that can be given to agriculture; and, that the refusing of leases is the greatest pos- sible impediment to agricultural industry, and of course, to the production of corn, where- of our chief food is made. Secondly, that, of late years, there have arisen strong pre- judices against the granting of leases; that this prejudice is daily increasing; and that, so powerful is it, that an owner would as soon alienate the fee simple of his estate as demise it for a term of years.—That such is the real state of the case cannot, I think, be denied. Few land-holders in the House of Commons can be ignorant of the facts stated by the agricultural surveyors; and, I believe, few of them will deny, that it would be ad- vantageous to them if it were otherwise, and if they could venture to let long leases as for- merly. The effect of this impediment to agricultural industry, is, a dead loss to the country; because, it prevents the land from being so well cultivated as it would be by the very same persons that are employed on it, and which persons eat just as much as if they worked more. No land at yearly rent was ever yet cultivated to the best advantage; and to yearly rents all the farms in the kingdom are fast approaching. But, though the agri- cultural surveyors, as well, indeed, as every one else, can clearly see, that the granting of long leases would remove this greatest of all impediments to agricultural industry, none of them seem to have thought it necessary to make the least inquiry as to the *impediment to the granting of leases*. They do, indeed, talk about a "prejudice;" a "strong "prejudice;" an "unreasonable pre- "judice;" but, this is not the way to set- tle so material a point. Call it prejudice, if you will; but, then we come back to the place whence we started, and I ask you, whence this prejudice has arisen. What is the cause of it? Do you say, that it has arisen from the folly, or whim, of the land-owners? Then I ask: how did this whim never happen to take them before? For, you yourselves say, that, it is only of *late years*, that they have be- gun to refuse to grant long leases.——I have before thrown out some hints as to the true *cause* of this reluctance of landlords to grant leases; but I will here treat the matter a little more at large. Before the commencement of the very rapid depre- ciation of money occasioned by the enor- mous loans, the consequent increase of the quantity of paper-money, and especially by the stoppage of cash payments at the Bank; before this epoch, leases of farms were usually granted for 21 years; some for 14 years; some for 11 years; and some, but comparatively very few, for a term so short as that of 7 years. Last summer a large temporary aid was pro- posed to be granted to the Civil List, and also a permanent addition to it. That the the grant was made by parliament we know; and, it should not be forgotten, that it was called for upon the ground of the *vast rise in prices* (which is another phrase for depreciation of money), which had taken place, since the annual allow- ance for the civil list was fixed by parlia- ment; that is to say, since the year 1787.

Mr. Pitt said (See Parl. Debates, Vol. II. p. 905), "that no gentleman who reflected on the very considerable rise that had taken place in every article of domestic consumption and accommodation, could be surprized that His Majesty had not confined his expenses, under that head, within limits that had been marked out so long since. An increase of 40, 50, or 60l. per centum had taken place in such articles since the year 1787." Mr. Rose, in his pamphlet upon the civil list, published in 1801, stated the rise at 75l. per centum, and, in some cases at 100l. per centum. But, we have better facts to proceed upon than the statements and calculations of these gentlemen. That is to say, a circumstantial account of the rise in the price of bread, which is the true standard of the real value of money, for the last fifty years. From this account (which see in Vol. VI. p. 239) it appears that the

	s.	d.
Average price of the quartern loaf, during the ten years ending with 1760, was	0	5¾
During the ten years ending with 1770.....	0	6½
During the ten years ending with 1780.....	0	7
During the ten years ending with 1790.....	0	7½
During the thirteen and a half years ending in July, 1804	1	0

Such then, has been the progress of the depreciation of money. Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Pitt will say: "no; it is *not depreciation of money*; it is only *rise in the price of commodities*." Be it so; but, call it what you will, the *consequence* is precisely the same to whomsoever is obliged to live upon a *fixed* income. Wheatley excepts the landholders from those who suffer on account of the depreciation of money; because, says he, they can *raise their rents* to keep pace with the depreciation. Very true; and precisely for that reason it is, that they will now let their lands only from year to year. Previous to the year 1795 (for it was not till then that the rapid depreciation of money began) landlords had no objection to let long leases; because, as will be perceived by the progress in the rise of prices above exhibited, even a twenty-one years' lease produced but a slight falling off in the real value of their rents; but, when the man who had granted a twenty-one years' lease in the year 1780 found, in 1795, that his rent, though it preserved its nominal value, was really worth little more than half as much as it was when he let his farm; when he perceived, that other farms of the same value, now let for twice as much as he was receiving for his; when he perceived, that while he was daily sinking into poverty, his tenant was swelling into riches, and only waiting for the moment to ride over him; he began to inquire into the cause, and, when the lease expired, took good care not to grant another for above two or three years at most. Some landlords have continued to grant leases; and there will be still some found to do it for a year or two longer perhaps. Habit is very powerful; and, besides, the cause is not well enough understood to prevent all landlords from believing, that a good swinging addition to the old rent will secure them for the next 14 or 21 years. But, if the present system of finance be pursued, this purblind state will soon go off: the consequences will become visible to the dullest eyes: and then, as Mr. Kent says, the landlord will, indeed, as soon alienate the fee simple of his estate as demise it for a term of years.——Such, then, though the Agricultural Surveyors do not appear to have obtained even a glimpse of it, is the real cause of the refusal, on the part of landlords, to grant leases, which refusal is stated to be, and undoubtedly is the most powerful impediment to agricultural industry. And how comes it that it has never attracted the attention, or, at least, never engaged the deliberative faculties, of parliament? It certainly is not, because it lies too deep for discovery, but, on the contrary, because it is too obvious. The moment the fact is ascertained, that the landlords refuse any longer to grant leases, the mind of every intelligent man traces back the effect to its efficient and only cause. But, where is the remedy? Who shall *remove* that cause? The impediment to agricultural industry is found in the refusal to grant leases; that refusal in the rapid depreciation of money; that depreciation in the excessive quantity of paper-currency; that currency in the stoppage of cash payments; that stoppage in the immense sums quarterly demanded *in payment of the interest on the national debt*. "Hah!" methinks I hear some Pittite exclaim, in the hollow voice of a tragedy hero, "beware how you touch the vitals of your country!" If such be her vitals, I would not stake much upon her existence for another four years, either of war or peace. Yet this is really the notion, which almost all men of all parties appear to have adopted. When a demand is made for money, the *mode of raising it* is the only subject of censure or criticism; and, when the minister is driven hard upon that head; "Well," says

he, "shew me a better way: if not you "cannot find fault that I pursue this, for "I tell you that so much must be got, or I "cannot pay the interest of the national "debt." To put an end to the payment of that interest; to suspend the payment during war; even to reduce it in amount; never seems to come, for one moment, athwart the mind of any man. To hear people talk upon this subject, a total stranger to our situation and circumstances, would think the national debt to be something belonging to the soil or the atmosphere of the country. We look at its progress with apprehension and even with terror; but we seem to wait for its final effects with that sort of feeling that malefactors wait for the day of execution. Here! here! and no where else, is the canker-worm that is eating out the heart of England! And till that ever-gnawing worm be killed, one moment's real peace she will never know.

BLACK REGIMENTS.——The following extract is taken from a ministerial paper of the 21st instant. "Government is said to "have contracted with a mercantile house "in the West Indies, for a supply of 5,000 "African negroes, from the age of 16 to 30, "to serve as soldiers in the Leeward Islands. "The contract is to be completed within a "year, and application has been made by "the contractors to merchants in London "and Liverpool, to assist them in com-"pleting their engagement. Mr. B. of the "latter place, has agreed to furnish one thou-"sand negroes at 55 l. per *head!*"—Per *head!* and by *contract* too! And while a bill is before the House of Commons for abolishing the slave trade! What, are we, then, to send recruiting parties to the coast of Guinea! Are these negro-soldiers to be raised by negro parish officers, or how? This, if true, seems to have been all that was wanted to cap the climax of inconsistency and absurdity. We have, we are told, 800,000 men in arms (for the statement is now swelled to that), and yet we are driven to such means to preserve our most valuable colonies, which, let it be observed, do not require an establishment of more than 15,000 men, do not occasion a waste of more than 3,000 men in a year, and which waste might be easily reduced to half that number.——In a former page will be found a letter from a correspondent, who is in favour of this sooty system: his reasons do not convince me; and, I am firmly persuaded, that, if it be persevered in, we shall have no West India colonies in a very short space of time. Observe, that these negro, these slave soldiers, who are to protect British colonies, to wear the British uniform, and to march under the British flag, are to cost, in the first instance, 55 l. a man! But, the cost is nothing compared with the disgrace. I have always thought it unwise to have negroes in the army at all, even as musicians, though that is a situation in which, if in any, they might be suffered. But, they ought never to march in the same corps; they ought never to wear a rag of the same uniform; never to live in the same barrack or camp with white men. They are lazy, they are insolent, they are beastly; they are fit for nothing but slavery, and the encouragement they receive in England is a disgrace to the country; a disgrace that no other country upon earth submits to, and which is not submitted to here from any motive worthy of applause. I like the West Indies as colonies, and I like the West Indians as fellow subjects; but, I like England better, and rather than see her further disgraced by a sort of fellowship with Guinea; rather than see myself a fellow-subject of these slave soldiers, much rather would I see the West India islands totally independent of this country. What! "800,000 "men in arms," and not, 3,000 a year to spare for colonies like those in the West Indies! Who will believe *both* of these facts? Napoleon tells his Majesty, that he has already more colonies than he knows how to preserve; and, really, one would think so from the adoption of desperate measures like that now said to be in contemplation.

OVERTURES FOR PEACE.——When the letter from Napoleon was first announced in London, it was observed in this work, and, indeed, by every person of common discernment, that, let the result be what it would, it would prove to have been a politic step on the part of France; for that, at any rate, Napoleon would acquire the reputation of being a lover of peace. That the letter was intended for *publication* is very likely; but, we know that it has been published; and, though the ministerial writers affect not to have perceived the circumstance, we know very well what impression the publication has produced in the minds of the people in this country. The French papers, containing the letter, arrived in London on the 14th instant, in the evening papers of which day a translation of it appeared. The very next morning, by eight o'clock, the hawkers were crying it about the streets, printed upon a narrow slip of paper, with the following words at the head of it: "GOOD NEWS FOR OLD "ENGLAND! PEACE WITH BUONAPARTÉ, "AND CHEAP BREAD FOR THE POOR!" This is that same Buonaparté, against whom all the handbills and cannibal-like prints were published about a year and a half ago!

This is that very same Buonaparté, whom the courageous "patriotic hand-bill" men represented as being toasted upon a fork by the devil before hell-fire! Where are these hand-bill men now? One of their fellow-labourers, the patriotic conductor of the Times newspaper, does, indeed, seem to have taken the alarm at this returning love for Buonaparté. It is a subject of too delicate a nature to be dashed into at once; but the patriotic gentleman very broadly hints, that if the people take this turn all is over with us. That they will take this turn the patriotic Treasury writer may be assured, unless a course of policy very different from the present be pursued. Napoleon still sticks to the Treaty of Amiens. He will make us give up Malta. And, all the world knows, that it was for Malta, "plain Malta after all," as Mr. Fox said, that our ministers went to war. Peace would suit Napoleon very well. He wants some naval stores, which at present he cannot get. He wants to re-inforce his colonies; and to open a free communication with them again for a year or two. And, all the while, our expenses must be the same very nearly that they are now. His gun-boats would go on daily increasing, and at a greater rate than at present, because he would then have an abundance of naval stores. Before we had wound up the account of the war, a new war would be necessary; and, besides, under our present system, military, naval, and *financial*, we can never again disarm, as long as France retains her present power and possessions. Mark, I beg, the qualification! *Under our present system*, the paper-money part of it in particular, we never can return, for one single year, to a peace establishment. This Napoleon well knows. He risks nothing by giving us a short respite under the name of peace; and with the offer of peace, therefore; with pacific and conciliating professions, he will frequently embarrass and distract us.

Invasion.——The shaking fit appears to be coming on again! My readers will remember, that, at the time when a discussion respecting the failure of Mr. Pitt's military project was first talked of (about a month ago), the Treasury writers asserted, that the failure was of no consequence, seeing that the danger of invasion "being "now over," there was no necessity for immediate levies. Upon this occasion the Oracle, which is under the immediate direction of the principal "young friend," asked, if "any one could now *seriously* enter-"tain apprehensions of an invasion!"... "The enemy threatened our shores," said the Morning Post at the Catamaran time, "let them now look to their own. Their "innumerable flotilla was to land their in-"vincible army in this country, which "was to prove a rich and easy conquest. "Where is now this boasted flotilla? "What is the present state of the fortune "and destiny of France, which were so "pompously committed to it? It skulks "in its harbours, and even doubts whe-"ther its skulking will insure its safety!" In the Oracle of the 19th of January it was asserted, that "universal discontent "prevailed amongst the troops at Bou-"logne; that all idea of their embarking "for the purpose of invasion had been "*abandoned*; and that the flotilla-men "were ready to turn their arms against "their commanders." Similar sentiments have been over and over again expressed by the ministerial prints during even the present month. But now, behold, as soon as the sun begins to melt the icicles, the danger is become as imminent as ever. It is curious indeed to observe how these writers, having received their cue from the clerks of the Treasury, sneak back to the language of alarm. "Nothing," says the Times of the 21st instant, "can be "farther from our heart, than to wish to "see any thing like *panic* or *trepidation* "in our countrymen; but a fatal security, "and a wilful deafness, are still more to "be apprehended. As to the overture, "we are distinctly told by the Moniteur, "that the same policy preceded the battle "of Marengo and the passage of the "Drave; and can we refuse to under-"stand what is now to follow it? *Do we* "*not see plainly, that the epocha is at hand;* "that preparations have been made upon "a vast scale, for which two years are a "very short period;—that two consider-"able squadrons, with troops on board to "a large amount, have put to sea already "since that overture, of which the desti-"nation is totally unascertained, and the "subject only of speculation and conjec-"ture? Do we not know, that the Dutch "fleet is under sailing orders in the Texel, "and that every thing announces the pro-"ject of sending out the grand fleet from "Brest harbour? Some persons, we have "been given to understand, are weak "enough to imagine, that the effect of "those Continental alliances, of which "we have only heard by the subsidies, "will be to occupy and divert the "French armament from attempting our "shores; but is it not far more pro-

" bable, that *it will be to accelerate* " *the grand attack*, before any diversion " or distraction can be occasioned by the " tardy movements of Continental auxilia- " ries?——But supposing even that we are " too much alert and sensible to these " threats and demonstrations upon the part " of France, and that our combination is " liable to the censure of too much pru- " dence and alarm; we will conclude by " submitting to the public judgment, whe- " ther this be not the side to mistake upon, " and whether the danger be not in the op- " posite error, of too much confidence and " tranquillity?——It does not seem to us, " indeed, that the present ought to be, in " any sense or degree, *a moment of more con-* " *fidence or security, than those at which the alarm* " *has been most powerfully sounded.* The pre- " parations of the enemy are either com- " plete, or in great forwardness, and two " of his fleets are actually at sea. In calling, " therefore, the public attention to these " circumstances, we are conscious that we " are acquitting ourselves of a great duty to " our country; and we would sooner have " our judgment questioned by those who " may think differently, than omit it."—— So, then, the five millions which the parliament has voted for subsidies are calculated only to *accelerate* an attack upon our shores! The object of publications of this sort is evident enough: they are intended to keep the people stirring; to prevent the zeal of the volunteers from evaporating quite to the dregs; to counteract the effect of Napoleon's letter, of "GOOD NEWS FOR OLD EN- " GLAND," of which mention was made above. The Morning Post, which, only ten days ago, congratulated its readers on the " near approach of the day, when we should " be able to say to the tyrant:" (for such it called him) " burn, burn your flotilla, or " we will hurl you from the throne that " you have usurped!" that very Morning Post is now terror-stricken to a degree that has made it quite religious.——" Yesterday " being the day appointed for the solemn " fast and prayer for the success of His Ma- " jesty's arms, was observed with becoming " devotion by all descriptions of people. Yet " an *air of satisfaction* was mingled with the " solemnity of the occasion, which we did " not observe on any other day of general " fast and prayer since the commencement " of the war. It was because the blessings " of Heaven and our own exertions have " now placed us in a situation to look for- " ward to the conflict without any fear of " the result; and *because we have reason to* " *believe the enemy has been inspired with the* " *resolution of attempting, without delay, the long* " *menaced invasion*; of attempting it at the " same moment from all points, and with " all his forces, so that the issue will be im- " mediate and decisive. *Our* feeling on the " day of fast and prayer at the commence- " ment of the war, was a religious and pa- " triotic devotion, aware of the vastness of " the power, which threatened to over- " whelm us, trusting in the favour of Hea- " ven" [what shocking impiety! what a shameful mockery of the Almighty!] " to " a righteous cause, and in our own courage " and exertions, and resolved to perish with " arms in our hands rather than surrender " in the smallest degree our rights or our " honour; rather than suffer ourselves in " the least instance to be wronged or in- " sulted by an unprincipled and outrageous " pretender. On the second day of ge- " neral devotion, last year, *we* felt gratitude " to Heaven for having suffered our strength " to mature before the danger came on; we " looked forward to the contest with con- " fidence, and WE *prayed earnestly and sincere-* " *ly for its arrival!!!* Since that time, our " enemy appeared to have formed the reso- " lution of avoiding an experiment, which, " however he may vapour, he knew was " most hazardous to the duration of his ill- " gotten power. Now we have *to raise our* " *hearts to the Almighty*, in *exulting joy*, that it " has been *determined to make the long menaced* " *attempt!!!*" This, however, is really nothing, until we reflect on *who* it is that commits this to paper, or causes it so to be committed! " Ah, poor soul," says dame Quickly, " an a' beg as to *pray*, it's all over with " 'un." But your true thorough-paced Pittite has always at his command a sufficient portion of religious cant. Had Moliere and Foote lived in the days of the Pitt administration, the TARTUFFE and MOTHER COLE never would have been exhibited as singularities.—But, as to the subject before us, I beg it may be remembered, that the writers of the Treasury express their wishes that an invasion of the country may take place; that, they " raise their hearts to the Al- " mighty" [impious hypocrites!] " in gra- " titude, that the enemy has determined to " invade us!" And, this, observe, at the very moment, while the Church calls upon us to pray to God, that we may *not* be invaded, and swallowed up quick! The object, however, which I have now in view, is, to impress upon the mind of the reader, the fact, that the Treasury writers do express their wishes, that the enemy may invade the country; and, then, I wish to recall to his memory, that Mr. Archdale and others,

made it a great crime in me to have said that which they asserted to be likely to induce the enemy to attempt an invasion.——But, the truth is, that fear, base fear, is at the bottom of the hearts of these boasters. They tell us, that they have 800,000 men in arms; we know that they have 905 vessels of war, of which 183 are of the line of battle; and, yet they are afraid; yet they tremble; yet they even pray! Eight hundred thousand men in arms, and *pray!* Why the number is twice as great as that which Napoleon professes to have in arms. He never states his numbers at more than 500,000 men. What, then, are we afraid of? Why cannot we disband the half of ours? Has our valour, or our strength, depreciated as well as our currency? Has the Pitt administration sapped our hearts as well as our purses? Has it so completely degraded us, so completely altered the opinion we were wont to entertain of ourselves, that we are ready to allow that it requires three or four Englishmen to beat one Frenchman? If this be not the case, why keep 800,000 men in arms? Where is the use of it; especially while we have a fleet far superior to all the other fleets in the world put together?——As to the real state of the case respecting invasion, there appears, I think, very little probability, that it will be attempted, for two or three years to come, unless some internal circumstances should arise to favour it. It is so obviously the interest of Napoleon, as well as so exactly conformable to the plan long ago adopted in France, to keep us for years in our present state of uncertainty, agitation, and alarm within, while our fleets are exposed to the winds and the waves in the Channel, that, to expect an early attempt at invasion seems to discover an entire want of reflexion. The French government knows our situation as well as we ourselves do. They know what will ruin us. They know that time is constantly at work for them and against us, as long as our present system exists; and theirs is not a policy of "existing circumstances." They fix upon their point, and they keep on steadily towards it, till it be attained. One of the things which they ought to desire, is, that we may continue to be ruled by Lord Sidmouth and his Second, Mr. Pitt, aided by Lord Melville. It would be worth Buonaparté's while to make a considerable sacrifice rather than that these ministers should be changed. He will not yield upon the point of Malta; nor, indeed, will he concede any thing of real value; but I should not wonder, if, in order to give them popularity enough to preserve their places, he were to restore to them the cream-coloured horses, or some such thing, upon condition of England's restoring all the colonies and all the treasure she has taken from the allies of France; the fulfilment of the Treaty of Amiens, and, of course, the surrender of Malta, being a preliminary. Oh! how charming it would be to hear the "King's Friends" descanting on the importance, the value, the virtues, of the cream-coloured horses!

PARLIAMENTARY DIVISIONS.——The first division that took place in parliament, since the beginning of the present session, was on the 9th instant, upon the subject of the continuation of the suspension of the Habeas Corpus act in Ireland. Sir Evan Napean, Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant, moved for leave to bring in a bill for that purpose, to which motion an amendment was proposed by Sir John Newport, the object of which amendment was to procure the appointment of a secret committee of 21 members to inquire whether there were any grounds for continuing the said suspension. Upon this motion a division took place.

Noes	112
Ayes	33
Majority for the Minister..	79

In the House of Lords a division took place, on the 11th instant, upon a motion of Lord Spencer, to amend the address to his Majesty relative to the papers on the Spanish war, which address was moved by Lord Mulgrave, the Secretary of State for foreign affairs.

Noes	114
Ayes	36
Majority for the Minister..	78

In the House of Commons, on the 12th instant, a division took place upon a motion of Mr. Grey for amending the address, moved by Mr. Pitt, relative to the papers on the Spanish war.

Noes	313
Ayes	106
Majority for the Minister..	207

In the House of Lords, on the 15th instant, a division took place upon a motion of Lord Darnley for leave to bring in a bill to repeal Mr. Pitt's Additional Force Bill, better known under the appellation of Parish-Army Bill.

Noes	113
Ayes	45
Majority for the Minister..	68

In the House of Commons, on the 15th instant, a division took place upon a motion made by Lord Henry Petty for limiting the duration of the Irish Habeas Corpus Suspension Bill to the term of two months, in order to afford time for making an inquiry into the reasons for continuing such suspension.

Noes 159
Ayes 54

Majority for the Minister 105

In the House of Commons, on the 21st instant, a division took place upon the motion of Mr. Windham, "that it be referred "to a committee of the whole House to revise the several bills for the defence of "the country, and to consider of such further measures, as may be necessary to "make that defence more complete and "permanent;" a motion expressed in the very same words, in which was expressed Mr. Fox's motion of the 23d of April last, which motion was strenuously supported by Mr. Pitt.

Noes 242
Ayes 96

Majority for the Minister 146

Some circumstances relating to this last motion and division deserve to be particularly noticed. The public are informed, that the discussions of the important subject of our military force has been looked forward to with great expectation from the first day of the session; and, to those who are unacquainted with the motives, it will, doubtless, appear strange, that the minister in second, who is also a famous colonel, should not attempt to answer a speech of three hours, in which the imbecillity of his projects was so amply exposed, but to leave the task to be performed by a mere "young friend," and then to call for the question. And, still stranger must this appear, when it is recollected, with what boldness of words Mr. Pitt defied the inquiry, on the first day of the session. "The honourable gentleman" (Mr. Fox) "has," said he, "adverted to the bill which I last session introduced for the defence of the country, and has expressed a hope that some more efficient bill will be substituted in its room. This is not the time for a discussion on the subject, but I feel myself called upon to state, that I have seen no reason to alter my opinion of the grounds on which that bill was founded, and though I admit that its effects, in adding to the numbers of our military force, have indeed been exceedingly small, nothing that has happened, considering all the circumstances under "which the bill was proposed, and the "principles on which it proceeded, induces "me to think that it was a measure which "ought not to have been adopted. *I am "ready at any time to meet the honourable "gentleman and his friends in reviewing the "state of the country* in all its various relations. I am ready, in *particular to meet "the honourable gentleman, respecting the "state of our military force* and the *improved "condition in which it now stands, compared "to what it was last session.* I am *ready "to shew* that, at the present moment, "we have a regular disposeable force far "more considerable than gentlemen seem "to be aware of."* —— And yet, when the time came; when he was called upon to do what he was thus so firmly pledged to do; when the folly of his projects, when the utter inefficiency of all his measures, were fairly brought forward, he sat mute, and delegated *Mr. Canning* to make his defence! Indeed, to have attempted to answer Mr. Windham, in this instance, must have rendered the defeat and humiliation still more signal than it was. After a speech of such length, containing so much useful information, discovering so perfect a knowledge of every part of a great and interesting subject, exhibiting so many original views; coming immediately after such a speech, mere words, mere frothy declamation, which, in this case, is all the House would have heard, would have forced into men's minds a contrast very disadvantageous to Mr. Pitt. This he appears to have been fully aware of, and, therefore, he did not venture to speak. He would have been *cheered*; but, knowing very well how to estimate that sort of cheering, he was not disposed to trust to its effects in opposition to those of the facts and the reasoning, which his audience had just been so attentively listening to, and which it was not in his power to controvert. What would any friend of Mr. Pitt have said, if, four years ago, any one had predicted what has now happened to that gentleman? Who would then have believed, that, in so short a space of time, he would have fallen so low as, upon any subject, and under any circumstances, not to dare venture on a speech, lest he should not obtain a hearing? That he would have been heard with more patience than Mr. Canning was is certain; but it is equally certain, that his speech would have been very flat. It was noticed, that, during the greater part of Mr. Windham's speech he appeared sunk; *accablé*, to use a French word; and, indeed, there was poured on

* Parl. Debates, Vol. III. p. 37.

him wherewithal to sink a stouter man. His cause was so bad; his projects were all so completely exposed; he appeared, as to military affairs, in a light so perfectly inferior to his antagonist, that, to have attempted an answer to Mr. Windham would only have been a proof of a total want of discernment, or of feeling The division was much less on both sides than it would have been, if the House had not been taken by surprise. Many members had taken the opportunity which Mr. Canning's speech afforded them of retiring to take refreshment; and, as Sir William Young's reply to Mr. Canning was but short (as, indeed, the speech required very little reply), they had not returned before the division took place.——The representation which the Pitt newspaper, the SUN, has given to this debate, is worth notice. "Last night," says that paper of yesterday, "Mr. Windham brought forward "his long promised motion in the House "of Commons respecting the state of our "military defence. The debate took a sin- "gular and very unexpected turn; for, after "a most *able and eloquent reply* from Mr. "Canning, *the opposition did not feel them- "selves disposed to continue the contest*, or "possibly hope to derive some advantage "from an early division; and this threaten- "ed attack, which was to shake the stabi- "lity of the administration, ended in their "*complete triumph*. It is evident that there "is *a want of cordiality in the different orders "of the opposition*, as not one of the members "of the old one supported Mr. Windham, "and as Mr. Sheridan, as soon as the mo- "tion of that gentleman was disposed of, "announced his intention of bringing "forward another *of a similar kind*." ———This is most curious logic. *Because* Mr. Sheridan, immediately after Mr. Windham's motion was disposed of, proposed to bring forward another of a *similar kind*, it is *evident* that there is a want of cordiality amongst the different orders of the Opposition! Another proof of this is, that not one of the Old Opposition supported Mr. Windham's motion. Sir William Young followed, and effectually replied to the little that was urged by Mr. Canning: therefore, there was no *support* of Mr. Windham's motion wanted; and it was the ministry that cried out for the question, and hastened the division, and not the Opposition. And this is what this Pitt news writer calls a "complete triumph!" The complete triumph of 242 over 96 is all that he looks to. Not so, however, Mr. Pitt. He knows that mere numbers will not long do. He knows what difference there is in men. And he knows too, that, there are a hundred thousand thinking people who will read Mr. Windham's speech, and who will in vain look for an answer to any part of it in the "able and eloquent "speech of Mr. Canning."——Mr. Sheridan has given notice of a motion for the repeal of the Parish-Army Bill, which motion will be made on next Tuesday week. In the mean time, it appears, from a circular letter to the Lords Lieutenant, that the ministers have resolved on levying the fines upon the parishes, whose officers have not raised their quota of men; and, it is said, that orders are actually issued for causing the money to be assessed. Thus, as was foretold, this scheme has ended where all Mr. Pitt's other schemes have ended, *in a tax*. The present tax will be attended with one advantage; it will make men *begin* to understand that there is no longer any danger of their being balotted for in the militia or army of reserve; and, they will, of course, quit the volunteer corps with great alacrity, and remain steadily at their work again; a change that will contribute not less to their own happiness than to the tranquillity and safety of their country.

THE CATHOLIC PETITION is said to be unanimously agreed to. Lord Fingal, Sr Thomas French, Sir Edward Bellew, with Messrs. Dennis Scully, and James Ryan, are appointed to present it, and to proceed to London forthwith; a Committee of twenty-one remain in Dublin to correspond with the Deputies while occupied in their Mission.

ERRATUM. In the last line but two of the English part of p. 256 read *wait* instead of *await*. The reader himself will correct some less important errors in that poem.

☞ Owing to an unfortunate disagreement, as to prices, between the master and journeymen printers, which disagreement extends through the whole trade, except that part which belongs to the daily papers, where the arrangement is entirely different, it is possible, that the Register may be prevented from appearing next week.—I hope, on every account, that this will not be the case; but, if it should, the readers will have perceived, that even the parliamentary papers are not exempted from the inconvenience arising from the same cause.

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